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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

CONTENTS

	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	2
II. THE MASSACRES IN RWANDA	3
III. MILITARY ASPECTS	4
IV. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS	5
V. EXPANDED MANDATE OF UNAMIR	6
VI. POLITICAL PROSPECTS	9
VII. OBSERVATIONS	11

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Shortly After the Security Council adopted resolution 918 (1994), Mr. *Igbal* Riza, Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, and Maj.-Gen. J. Maurice Baril, my Military Adviser, left on a special mission to Rwanda. The present report, presented in response to the council's request in paragraphs 7 and 20 of the above-mentioned resolution, reflects their findings and recommendations as reviewed by me.
2. The special mission's purpose was:
 - (a) To move the warring parties towards a cease-fires
 - (b) To ascertain from them their views on and intentions towards the implementation of resolution 918 (1994);
 - (c) To review with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) the modalities of the concept of operations outlined in my report of 13 May 1994 (S/1994/565).
3. The special mission was in the area from 22 to 27 May 1994. In Kigali it met the Commanders of the Rwandan government forces, namely Maj.-Gen. Augustin Sizimungu, Chief of Staff of the Rwandese Armed Forces, and Maj.-Gen. Augustin Sizilimana, Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie, and, in Gitarama, the head of the_'interim Government' formed an 8 April 1994, Mr. Jean Kambanda. on the side of the Rwrandese Patriotic Front {RPF} it met its Chairman, Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe, in Mulindi and the Commander of the RPF forces, Maj.-Gen. Paul Kagame, in Byumba. In UNAMIR, discussions were hold with the Force Commander, Maj-Gen. Romeo Dallaire, and senior military and civilian officials. During the special mission's visit. my special Representative, Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, currently based in Nairobi, was visiting other countries in the region to obtain their support, especially the contribution of troops, for UNAMIR's expanded mandate established by resolution 918 (1994).
4. Both sides had assured Maj.-Gen. Dallaire that they would observe an informal truce during the visit of Mr. Riza and Maj.-Gen. Baril. Nevertheless, firing and shelling continued, especially in and around Kigali, apparently as a result of RPr's continued offensive in the area and the Rwandan government forces defensive fire. These conditions inconvenienced the special mission's movements somewhat, causing it to lose much time.

II. THE MASSACRES IN RWANDA

5. The number of Rwandan children, women and men who were murdered in the frenzy of massacres over the past seven weeks will probably never be determined accurately. As time passes evidence erodes and witnesses vanish. The estimate is that between 250,000 and 500,000 were killed a substantial proportion of Rwanda's population of 7 million. In hypothetical proportional terms, this would be approximately equivalent to 2 to 4 million in France, 4 to 8 million in Bangladesh, 5 to 10 million in Brazil and 9 to 19 million in the United States of America. Tens of thousands more have been maimed, or wounded in Rwanda.
6. As noted in the statement of the President of the Security Council of 30 April (S/PRST/1994/21), these massacres and killings have continued in a systematic manner throughout the country, especially in the areas under the control of members or supporters of the armed forces of the interim Government of Rwanda, which was installed immediately after the death of the late President in the crash of his aircraft on 6 April. This assessment has *been* corroborated in the talks that the special mission had with the parties, the Force Commander and other UNAMIR personnel, humanitarian aid personnel and also with journalists who reached the sites* of carnage in various parts of Rwanda soon after they occurred.
7. The special mission was informed that the killers included members of the Rwandan government forces, but in the main were drawn from the Presidential Guard and the interhamwe, the youth militia recruited and formed by the late President's party. The head of the interim Government and the chiefs of staff of the Rwandese Armed forces and the Gendarmerie acknowledged that this was the case, at the same time alleging that RPF bore equal culpability for the massacre. However, this allegation was not corroborated by the sources cited in paragraph 6 above. Their description of events suggested that, as it advanced towards the capital, RPF assembled, in several camps, the population it found, many of whom had fled, presumably along with most of those responsible for the killings. RPF explains that the purpose of these camps is to screen the population for members of interhamwe and others suspected of the killings. According to some of the sources, such individuals, when identified, are executed. RPF denies this charge, declaring that, while such incidents may have occurred in the early stages of its advance, such persons* are now being held for investigation and trial. It does, however, acknowledge that armed persons in civilian clothing have been killed by RPF personnel.
8. The special mission found that the RPF zone is virtually empty, although some farmers appear to be returning to their fields from the RPF camps. In the Rwandan government forces-controlled zones, there are increasing numbers of displaced persons who have fled or are fleeing the RPF advance and who are seeking refuge in camps in subhuman conditions with no assurance even of daily food. This exodus is due in part to alarming radio broadcasts from Rwanda government forces zones, especially Radio Kills Collines, which also broadcasts incitements to eliminate RPF supporters. These refugee columns

and concentrations are screened by militia and the *Rwandan* government forces, and there are reports that RPF supporters are killed when identified.

9. R.PF declares that the aim of its military offensive is to rescue those presumably RPF supporters who find themselves in danger of their lives in the Rwandan government forces zone. Another aim is to seize those responsible for the massacres. Accordingly, APT insists that a condition for a cease-fire is that the Rwandan government forces commit themselves to halting the killings that still are taking place.(This point has been included in the draft cease-fire document mentioned in paragraph 14.)
10. The summary above, based on information obtained by the special mission, carries prima facie credibility in the light of circumstantial evidence. Clearly, only a proper investigation can establish the facts and definite culpability, but the efficacy of such an exercise diminishes as time weakens evidence and disperses living witnesses.
11. In this context, the Security Council should be made aware of certain events that, in retrospect, might have had implications regarding the massacres. Between December 1993 and March 1994, UNAMIR took note on several occasions of inflammatory broadcasts by Radio Mille Collines and suspicious movements by armed groups, apparently include the interhamwe, and cautioned *the* provisional Government in both respects. UNAMIR also received evidence that arms were being brought into the country and protested to the provisional Government and also conveyed this information to the diplomatic community. on one occasion the Force Commander requested Headquarters for permission to use force to recover a cache of arms and was instructed to insist that the Gendarmerie conduct that operation under UNAMIR supervision.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

12. As the members of the Council are aware, on the second day after the crash of the presidential aircraft and the start of the massacres, RPF launched a military offensive against the Rwandan government forces and the "interim Government". At the present time, RPF holds about half of the territory of Rwanda (see attached map), including strong positions in and around Kigali, especially the airport and its approaches. This brings RPF to control parts of the borders with Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania in addition to the entire border with Uganda. The Rwandan government forces hold the rest of the country, mainly the areas west and south of the capital and a stronghold in the Gisyeni-Ruhengeri area in the north-west, where fighting continues. These areas abut on parts of the borders with Burundi and Zaire.
13. Kigali is virtually a ghost city devoid of normal activity. As RPF strengthens its hold on the capital, refugees have been streaming out of the city through the only accessible exit towards Gitarama in the west, some continuing south. The Rwandan government forces have also withdrawn a substantial number of their forces, redeploying them in the Gitarama area and other positions in the

west and south. Control of the capital appears to hang in balance, while intense fighting continues

14. In this situation, the special mission was able to obtain the agreement of the two sides to initiate talks for the establishment of a cease-fire as called for by the Security Council in resolution 918 (1994). RPT's insistence that it would not deal, directly or indirectly, with the de facto authorities in Gitarama was accepted by the other side. A working paper, to serve as a basis for the talks, was prepared by the special mission and the Force Commander. The first meeting was held between military staff officers on 30 May at UNAMIR headquarters with the Deputy Force Commander acting as intermediary, and the talks were to resume on 2 June.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

15. The repercussions of the convulsion in Rwanda are enormous. Estimates, in the unsettled conditions prevailing, indicate that displaced persons are in the range of 15 million, with an additional 400,000 refugees in bordering countries. This would mean that over a quarter of Rwanda's population has been afflicted. The greater number of displaced persons are in zones controlled by the Rwandan government forces, where authority beyond Gitarama, Giseyeni and Butare appears to be uncertain. Consequently, neither United Nations agencies nor non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been able to commence an *effective* programme, beyond sporadic deliveries where possible. *In the RPF zone*, more systematic humanitarian assistance programmes have commenced, but under strict RPF controls, against which the organisations distributing assistance have protested. *These* programmes are conducted from Kabale, in southern Uganda, by the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs. The Office of the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR) is supporting refugees in the neighbouring countries. These activities are coordinated by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs through arrangements outlined in my last report (9/1994/565).

16. The special mission emphasized to the de facto authorities in Gitarama and to the Rwandan government forces military commanders the urgency of assuring conditions in the Rwandan government forces zone that would enable humanitarian assistance programmes to be commenced in those areas, as called for in resolution 918 (1994). Humanitarian agencies and NGOs also are making efforts to obtain such assurances. At present only ICRC maintains a presence in both Rwandan government forces and RPF zones and provides critical assistance, mainly medical, to the extent of its abilities and at high risk to its personnel. It is obvious that, in the conditions outlined in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is very urgent that, as called for in resolution 918 (1994), "secure humanitarian areas" be established where the estimated 2 million of these unfortunate displaced persons can be provided both security and assistance. They may require this support for an extended period even after a

cease-fire, until conditions permit them to return to their homes, or settle elsewhere, in reasonable safety. ,

V. EXPANDED MANDATE OF UNAMIR

17. It is evident that, even after a cease-fire is established, conditions in Rwanda will remain *uncertain* and insecure in many areas for an extended period. stability will return only when agreement on the resumption of a negotiated political process is reached. It is in this expectation that UNAMIR has to commence its additional tasks.

A. Cooperation by the parties

18. The most important prerequisite, assurances from both parties of cooperation with the mandate established by resolution 918 (1994), was secured by the special mission, although these assurances will require formalization as operations are initiated. However, their assurances will remain linked to the level of control both sides can exercise over their troops and armed elements. Under this mandate, UNAMIR will be required to carry out primarily two interlinked tasks, while continuing its mediation role in the talks for a cease-fire:

- (a) To attempt to assure the security of as many assemblies as possible of civilians who are under threat;
- (b) To provide security, as required, to humanitarian relief operations. 19. The conclusion of the special mission, after its discussions in Rwanda, is that the concept of operations outlined in my last report (S/1994/585) will require some adjustments as the situation evolves and more reliable data become available regarding threatened groups and displaced persons, especially in *the* Rwandan government forces zone. While agreeing to cooperate *with UNAMIR* in its tasks and in the deployment of its additional personnel, both sides raised questions regarding the conduct of operations on the ground. In particular, RPP expressed strong doubts as to whether 5,500 troops would be required, and the rationale was explained to them. The planned modalities of deployment are outlined below.

B. Kigali airport

20. As regards the concept of Kigali airport as a neutral zone, which is included in resolution 918 (1994), the Council will recall that, despite Maj.-Gen. ballaise's best efforts both before and after the adoption of the resolution, they Rwandan *government* forces did not transfer the control of the airport to UNAMIR. Subsequently, RPF occupied the airport by military means on 21 May and does not agree to relinquish control, citing UNAMIR's failure to obtain the same from the Rwandan government forces. It has indicated, however, that it would agree to a strengthened UNAMIR presence at the airport under arrangements similar to those which prevailed up to 6 April with Rwandan

government forces units (which were at the airport under the terms of the Arusha agreement) now being substituted by *RPP units*. *RPF would* encourage and allow civilian technical and operational staff to return to their duties in order to reactivate the airport, and would cooperate with UNAMIR in ensuring the safety of flights. The Rwandan government forces could, however, disrupt or halt operation of the airport with indirect fire, but assured the special mission that they would not interfere.

C. Phase 1

21. The implementation of phase 1 of the operation clearly remains urgent and must be commenced without further delay, even before a cease-fire is effected. The Government of Ghana is prepared to dispatch the required troops immediately. However, they can be deployed only when essential equipment, especially armoured personnel carriers, is provided and moved to Rwanda. Without equipment, the troops would be unprotected, immobile and ineffective. With these questions still to be settled, it is estimated that phase 1 will not be operational for another four to six weeks, depending on how soon the resources required are made available by Member states and delivered on the ground.

22. In this first phase, UNAMIR would strengthen its position in Kigali, including at the airport, and establish a mobile reserve for deployment wherever required for emergencies, including reinforcement. About half the battalion would be deployed to provide some security to major concentrations of displaced persons in the interior of *Rwanda where* they are in most danger. UNAMIR would make clear to the authorities *concerned* that they are primarily responsible for the safety of these civilian groups under monitoring by UNAKIR, which would be prepared to take the measures necessary should *this* responsibility be violated. Military observers would be stationed in other places where assembled civilians are not under *immediate* threat. During this first phase, UNAMIR also would establish security for major humanitarian supply depots and provide some escorts to convoys as required.

D. Phase 2

23. Because of the projected long delay in deploying the troops and equipment for phase 1, phase 2 should be initiated immediately, in close synchronization with phase 1. Owing to the logistical limitations of Kigali airport, alternative entry points would be utilized to deploy the two additional battalions, one mechanized and one motorized. This phase would be implemented in one of two possible scenarios:

- (a) **No cease-fire in place at the time of deployment.** In this scenario, the additional units would establish and protect "recurs areas", either by extending protection to existing assembly areas of threatened civilians or setting up new areas to which endangered civilians could be moved for safety. Clearly, the intention would be to maintain these secure areas only until such time as displaced persons case return to their placer of origin or settle in other areas of their choice in reasonably secure conditions;

- (b) **Cease-fire in place at the time of deployment.** **in** this scenario, displaced persons may be expected to begin to move out of the areas where they are assembled, and, therefore, resources required to protect "secure areas" can be reduced. This would enable GManIR to divert some of its additional resources in phase 2 towards monitoring the cease-fire on the terms agreed upon by the two parties. There is no intention to have UNAMIR assume the role of a buffer force unless the two parties so request and the council approves.

E. Phase 3

24. The need to deploy the two battalions envisaged for phase 3 would depend upon how one of the scenarios in phase 2 unfolds. If a cease-fire is still not established, the experience of phase 2 will determine whether the mandate and the concept of operations are demonstrating a level of effectiveness that requires reinforcement by the units envisaged for phase 3. If not, the mandate or operational plan or both may require revision. Alternatively, if a cease is established, it might be decided that these additional resources would not be required. In either case, urgent preparations for phase 3 must continue.

F. Flexibility of operations

25. During all three phases, flexible contingency plans *would be in place to* ensure *the* effective use of available assets to respond to demands of a situation that is, and is likely to remain, *fluid* for some time before it stabilizes. For instance, *should* Kigali airport not be operational or accessible, other airfields have already been identified *and* reconnaissance carried out.. In areas where humanitarian operations from bordering countries are evaluated as more effective in bringing assistance to displaced persons inside Rwanda, these routes would be used where required. Protection would be provided by UNAMIR to these operations, whether within the country or *across* borders, to the extent permitted by its available resources. In brief, coordination between *UNAMIR* and humanitarian agencies and NCOs would determine the most effective combination of "inside in" and "outside in" operations. 26. It is important for Council members to keep in mind that the concept of operations and the various scenarios are predicated on the assumption that the required troops with full equipment are made available to UNAMIR by Governments without further delay. Unless member states show a determination to take prompt and decisive action, UNAMIR will not *be* able to implement its mandate effectively or to have the impact required to improve the lot of the Rwandese people and begin to alleviate the intense suffering to which they have been subjected.

VI. POLITICAL PROSPECTS

27. It is axiomatic that any hope of resolving the historical tensions in Rwanda must rest on the prospects of a political compromise. Indeed, such were precisely the premise and goal of the Arusha agreement of 4 August 1993. The Security Council established UNAMIR to assist the parties in implementing the agreement, this task being disrupted *by* the breakdown of the Arusha process *in* the aftermath of the death of the late President on 6 April 1994.
28. As the members of the Security Council are aware, the circumstances surrounding the crash of the presidential aircraft, in which the President of Burundi was also killed, engender extreme suspicion. Only a thorough investigation could determine whether the aircraft was brought down deliberately. If so, it would be critical to identify the source of attack, as this would indicate a possible political motive, perhaps even whether the *violence* that followed *was* part of a planned pogrom. Regrettably, here also *the* passage of time, with *its* accompanying deterioration of evidence and dispersal of witnesses, will make it difficult to establish the facts.
29. It is encouraging that, in their discussions with Mr. Riza and Maj.-Gen. Baril, both sides recognized that only a political settlement could bring stability to Rwanda and that there could be no military solution. In this context, while both sides declared that the principles of the Arusha peace agreement remained valid as a framework, each stated that the now circumstances would necessitate renegotiation of certain parts of the agreement. Clearly, there is little likelihood that their approaches and aims in such negotiations would coincide. Therefore, this positive sign notwithstanding, it is evident that, even after a cease-fire, the initiation of negotiations will not be smooth.

A. position of the interim Government"

30. The head of the "interim Government" declared bluntly that the Arusha agreement rested on the fallacious premise that the tensions in Rwanda could be resolved by a political formula. The fundamental problem was ethnic the historic animosity between the majority Hutu who in the past had been ruled by the minority Tutsi. The Tutsi had never reconciled themselves to the democratic principle of government by the majority following the elections held on 18 September 1961 under United Nations supervision. Over the last 30 years, from bases in Uganda, the Tutsi had repeatedly tried to overthrow the democratic system by force. Having failed, they had resorted to a political stratagem following the introduction by the late President Habyarimana of a multiparty system in Rwanda in 1991. Having formed RPF as a political party, the Tutsi had induced other opposition parties to join the stratagem of arrogating to RPF far more political power than their demographic proportion of 15 per cent justified. 31. The negotiations at Arusha had been part of this stratagem, of which the mediators and the international community were unaware. Subsequently, RPF manoeuvres had "radicalized" the implementation process, split the opposition parties and aggravated tensions. Thus, RPF had exacerbated ethnic fears and animosities to a degree that, even had the broad-based transitional Government envisaged in the Arusha

agreement been installed, violence against their supporters inevitably would have exploded. Now that* could be no military solution: even if RPF expelled the Hutu population from Rwanda, they eventually would return to claim their rightful place. Therefore, in the view of this defacto authority, the only possible solution was a negotiated power-sharing formula within the principles of the Arusha agreement. This must guarantee the rights of both the minority and the majority, so that one would not fear domination by the other. Elections simply by themselves were not the answer, as they always would result in a Hutu majority Government, and there was no intention of installing permanent rule by the majority.

B. Position of RPF

32. The RPF position is that, although carrying a strong ethnic element, Rwanda's problems are political. RPF was formed as a multi-ethnic party and its aim was to promote political pluralism rather than ethnic rivalry. Extremist elements in the late President Habyarimana's party, the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement, in an anti-Tutsi party, the Comité démocratique républicain, and in the Rwandan government forces simply had not reconciled themselves to the political compromise in the Arusha agreement, which required the establishment of a broad-based transitional Government leading to elections in 1995. They had engineered repeated delays in the installation of the transitional Government, and had made repeated efforts for the inclusion in it of the extremist Comité démocratique républicain, thus infringing the Arusha agreement. These attempts to subvert the peace process having failed, these extremist groups had decided to resort to the extermination of the leaders, allies and supporters of RPF. A plan for widespread killings throughout the country had been prepared and targets identified. The coup had commenced with the assassination of the President on his return from Dar es Salaam, where he had agreed, with the Presidents of the United Republic of Tanzania and Burundi, to disregard the pressures from the extremists and to proceed with the installation of the transitional Government. The systematic manner and the scale of the massacres was clear evidence that these were not spontaneous or random killings.
33. RPF takes the position that the "interim Government" was installed by the same extremist elements in the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement and the Rwandan government forces who had planned and executed the massacres. Therefore, RPF considered the 'interim Government' a "criminal group" as well as an illegal entity and would have no contact with it, direct or indirect. Indeed, RPF is 'appalled' that the United Nations and Governments deal with this entity, even more so when they allow it to participate in decisions taken by the Security Council to deal with the situation in Rwanda that the 'interim Government' itself has instigated, while RPF as the other party cannot express its views.

34. RPF declares that it does not seek to impose a military solution, and would enter into political negotiations, within the principles of the Arusha agreement, only with representatives of political parties, including the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement, who did not comprise individuals involved with planning and executing the massacres of RPY supporters. Meanwhile, VP? would agree to cease-fire talks with Rwandan government forces officers since this military was the only functioning institution, despite the fact that its personnel had participated in the massacres. RPF agreed that an early ease-fire was essential to spare the Rwandans population continued suffering, but to achieve this ale the Rwandan government forces would have *to* commit themselves to *halting* the killings that still were continuing in the Rwandan government forces-controlled zone. This position of the Rwandese Patriotic Front *given to the* special mission was also conveyed dixectly to me in BY meeting at Headquarters on 44 May 1994 with the First Vice-President of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Mr. Patrick Mazimhaka.

C. Arusha framework

35. it thus is evident that, even when a casse-fire is achieved, the positions of this two parties are such that a determined mediation effort will be required to bring mutually acceptable interlocutors *to the* negotiating *table*. Nevertheless, it is a positive sign that both sides accept that the negotiations would be in the framework of the Arusha agreement and that both sides would seek a durable political formula to determine the sharing of power in order to resolve the specific problems of Rwanda.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

36. The magnitude of the human calamity that has engulfed Rwanda might be unimaginable but for its having transpired. On the basis of the evidence that has emerged, there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there have been large-scale killings of,communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group. The continuing hostilities impede a full investigation of these massacres and, regrettably, in any case procedures in the United Nations do not lend themselves to immediate action in such circumstances. In this situation, the international community must thank the men and women working in UNAMIR, humanitarian agencies, NGOs and the media for conveying the dimensions of the horror that overtook the people of Rwanda.
37. As the Security council is informed, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Joseph Ayala Lasso, has visited Rwanda. He has presented his report to the Commission an Human Rights, which has designated Mr. René Degni Segui as Special Rapporteur for Rwanda.
38. In the meantime, it is unacceptable that, almost two months since this violence exploded, killings still continue. Both parties must immediately cease such activities, there being strong *evidence* that the overwhelming responsibility lies with the "interim Government' and the Rwandan

government forces, which must immediately take effective measures to halt such killings in the zone under their control. It would *be* senseless to attempt to establish a cease-fire and to allow deliberate killings of civilians in the Rwandan government forces zone to continue. There is the danger that, if not stopped, *this would lead* to reprisals and counter-reprisals, setting off a prolonged cycle of violence.

39. Nevertheless, it is gratifying that the military authorities of both sides have commenced talks towards a cease-fire. I hope that they will show flexibility and enough concern for the suffering of their civilian compatriots to reach early agreement on cease-fire terms. The Force Commander of *UNAMIR* will make every effort to facilitate these talks and to support the practical implementation of the arrangements agreed upon. However, I repeat that a halt to the killings of civilians must be concomitant with a cease-fire.
40. The immediate priorities are to relieve the suffering of the displaced population and the fears of civilians under threat. The first requires organized humanitarian relief operations, which cannot be launched on the scale required unless adequate security conditions for them can be established. *UNAMIR* has already prepared plans to provide these conditions, which encompasses the second priority, the security of assemblies of civilians in peril. The ultimate aim of these humanitarian and security efforts would be, of course, to enable those affected to return to their homes or to seek security elsewhere in Rwanda as soon as conditions permit. As indicated above, some *humanitarian* relief is reaching the RPF zone. However, this does not appear practicable in the Rwandan government forces zone, where most of the displaced population is found, until *UNAMIR* is enabled to establish adequate security conditions there, while also introducing monitoring arrangements in the RPF zone. Clearly, these tasks assigned to *UNAMIR* by the Security Council in resolution 918 (1994) require the urgent provision of the necessary resources by Member States. I therefore again appeal to Governments to respond urgently to this need. I am grateful to the Governments of Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe for their offers of troops. However, these cannot be dispatched until the proper equipment is provided by other Governments.
41. Only when the killings have been halted, when a cease-fire is effective, humanitarian relief being provided and some semblance of security for the population. returns can there be hope for the underlying political issues to be addressed through negotiations. At that stage, it will be essential that the Organization of African Unity (OAU), neighbouring and regional Governments *and* all other interested Governments exert their influence upon both sides to demonstrate the commitment to compromise that alone can result in a mutually acceptable and durable-political solution to Rwanda's particular problems. It is essential that the arms embargo imposed by resolution 918 (1994) be respected, and that no armaments reach either party across any of Rwanda's borders. In this context, I intend to review the role of *UNOMUR*, which monitors only the border with Uganda, to assess whether it would be advantageous to integrate its resources into *UNAMIR* to strengthen the latter.

42. I trust that the information and assessments in the present report *will* enable the security Council to review the situation in Rwanda, where a humanitarian disaster, combined with widespread violence, requires urgent and decisive action. The two parties have commenced talks towards a cease-fire, but it is evident that national reconciliation will not be facile or swift. It will take some time for the Rwandese people to come to terms to reach a durable political compromise to resolve their tensions. It is the duty of the United Nations to assist in whichever way it can. I, therefore, recommend that the expanded mandate for UNAMIR be authorized by the Council for an initial period of six months, with the anticipation that at least another six-month renewal will be required. I intend to establish a special trust fund to support effective rehabilitation programmes in Rwanda, and I appeal to all Governments to contribute to it generously.
43. The delay in reaction by the international community to the genocide in Rwanda has demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond urgently with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict. Having quickly reduced UNAMIR to a minimal presence on the ground, since its original mandate did not allow it to take action when the carnage started, the international community appears paralysed in reacting almost two months later even to the revised mandate established by the Security Council. We all must recognise that, in this respect, we have failed in our response to the agony of Rwanda, and thus have acquiesced in the continued loss of human lives. Our readiness and capacity for action has been demonstrated to be inadequate at best, and deplorable at worst, owing to the absence of the collective political will. While attempting now to redeem these failings in the Rwandese crisis, the entire system requires review to strengthen its reactive capacity. It is my intention that such a review be conducted.
44. In concluding the present report, I should like to express my appreciation to Mr. Riza and Maj.-Gen. Baril for willingly undertaking this difficult mission. I also wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Mr. Booh-Booh, for his efforts to obtain support from Governments in the region to deal with the crisis in Rwanda. Even more, I reiterate once again my gratitude and high admiration to Maj.-Gen. Dallaire and the men and women of UNAMIR for their courage and continued dedication to their mission and to the Rwandese people under arduous and dangerous conditions.

