

***THE OAU AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA BEING***

***PAPER PRESENTED BY***

***MR. SAM IBOK***

***ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT AND HEAD OF THE  
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DIVISION OF THE OAU TO THE WORKSHOP ON THE  
EXPERIENCES OF INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MEDIATORS IN  
AFRICAN CONFLICTS***

***ORGANIZED BY***

***THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION OF  
THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA***

***AND***

***THE MWALIMUNYERERE FOUNDATION  
ARUSHA, TANZANIA, 21-23 JANUARY 1998***

It is now over three years since the OAU established its Mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. As it is very well known, the establishment of the Mechanism was aimed at providing the Organization with an Institutional capacity, for the first time in its history, to deal with the problem of instability and conflicts which have become almost endemic and destroyed the social fabric in many societies in Africa. That decision, was

informed by among other things, the mounting expectations of our people and also of the international community, to see a greater involvement by Africa and Africans, in the search for durable solutions to the many problems that unfortunately, still beset our continent. It was also based on the realization that we will only be credible in the eyes of the international community, when we take the lead in initiating actions that will help in ameliorating the effects of conflicts and instability within some of our member states.

Within the framework of the preventive mandate of the OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, we, at the OAU, have in the course of the past three years attempted to operationalise our Center for conflict management, even while dealing with the increasing numbers of potential or full blown conflicts on the continent. Such efforts have generally focused on the establishment of support structures and institutional capacity building; formulating a strategic vision and reordering of priorities; establishing networks and collaborative frameworks with national, sub-regional and international organizations, as well as with NGOs and the growing number of civil society groups, to build and strengthen constituencies for preventive diplomacy.

Conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy has essentially been handled by the OAU through a variety of approaches including the following:

- the use of the good offices of the Secretary General;
- the use of eminent personalities;
- the use of special envoys;
- the dispatch of special representatives of the Secretary General;
- direct contacts between the OAIJ and the governments of the countries concerned;
- field missions from the general Secretariat to conflict areas aimed at facilitating the process of mediation between the Parties concerned or assessing the impact of a conflict on the ground;
- confidence building deployments in areas of potential conflicts;

mobilizing and sensitizing the international community to support conflict prevention and peace building efforts in Africa.

Even though the bulk of the activities of the OAU, within the realm of conflict management should be in the field of prevention, since it is cheaper to prevent than to put out the flames of war, the objective reality obtaining in Africa, dictates that the role of the Organization remains that of a catalyst, facilitating negotiations between those at conflict, ensuring constructive involvement by way of diplomatic action and mediating conflicts and peace observations, including preventive deployment of military observers. Ultimately, we see the organization arching into peacekeeping to close the operational gap that the Organization experiences from time to time.

In the function of facilitation, the OAU has acted to assist those who are in conflict and who are willing to submit to negotiated settlements. Apart from the ongoing process in the Comoros, the most successful example was in Rwanda before the breakdown that precipitated the horrendous massacres and genocide of 1994. The OAU, in cooperation with the countries of the region, had maintained the momentum for negotiations that had culminated in the Arusha Peace Agreement of 1993. Through a combination of the sponsorship of the negotiation and the peace observation under the aegis of the military observer group, the OAU was able to inspire the confidence of the negotiators enough to spell out the most minute details of the pence Agreement. Of course, it remains a matter of deep regret that as a result of a combination of factors, some of them avoidable and others beyond the control of the OAU, the momentum of pence could not be maintained enough to avert the catastrophe that befell that country.

The OAU has undertaken preventive diplomatic actions to contain potentially explosive situations in countries such as the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, Zambia, The Comoros, and Burundi, to name but a few countries. These actions were undertaken as part of the preventive involvement of the Organization in containing incipient conflicts, intended to offer the concerned Parties, an opportunity for dialogue and accommodation.

At another level, we have raised our constructive involvement in conflict resolution efforts, to peace observation as a means of building confidence and creating a conducive environment for unfettered dialogue between the protagonists to a given conflict. In Burundi, for some years now, the OAU has been consistently involved in efforts to rebuild confidence and assist the political leaders of the country to sustain the momentum for peace. The OA13 Observer Mission in Burundi was initially composed of military and civilian observers, both aimed at confidence building. Currently, a similar Mission has been deployed by the OAU in the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros, where separatists on the Island of Anjouan, had decided to take their people into an uncertain and deeply troubling future. These limited military and civilian Missions of peace observation are in a sense, low-level preventive deployments, which have acted in some considerable measure as a disincentive to generalized violence. The OAU continues to maintain a strong presence in both Burundi and The Comoros and in the particular case of Burundi; to work very closely with the countries of the

Region and the Facilitator of the peace process Mwalimu Julius Nyerere to facilitate a peaceful solution to the crisis. In the Comoros, we are now involved in following up on the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, particularly, the convening of the Inter Comoran conference and the Round Table to address the socio-economic problems on the Islands.

In spite of the modest achievements that we have made in these different situations, we have at the same time, come to realize the difficulties associated with limited preventive deployments. This is why the OAU has now taken a conscious decision to look into how it can build an African capacity in peacekeeping, that can be put at the disposal of the United Nations and in exceptional cases, the Organization itself.

Beyond the tasks of helping in the resolution of active conflicts, the OAU is having to increasingly address some of the fundamental issues that have combined to produce some of the conflicts that confront the continent today. These include issues such as democratization and good governance, protecting and promoting respect for human rights and promoting

economic development as a means of building secure foundations of peace. The OAU takes these challenges seriously. The Organization is fully committed to the process of democratization in the continent, including through the observation; of multi party elections in different parts of the continent. Through the instrumentality of the African Commission on human and peoples' Rights, the OAU has fostered the development and protection of human rights on the continent. And while human rights violations may still occur on the continent, we have made- great progress in integrating a human rights agenda into the politics of Africa. Today, national human rights committees exist in many parts of Africa, acting as watchdogs of government performance in this area. Governments too have responded to this challenge, and increasingly, they are voluntarily submitting to performance assessment in the field of human rights, because after all, human rights are also African rights.

Ultimately, democratization, the observance of human rights, and economic development, are collectively the most valuable insurance that we have against social chaos and instability that precipitate conflicts.

In this brief presentation, I have attempted to highlight some of the activities undertaken by the OAU in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution. This is by no means an exhaustive exercise. It is also not intended to give an impression that the OAU has been able to achieve all the objectives that it set for itself when the conflict management mechanism was established in Cairo in 1993. I have already indicated earlier in this presentation, that when African leaders established the Mechanism, they clearly had in mind, the positioning of the OAIJ in the driving seat of ideas and plans for the management of conflicts in the Continent. Today, having operated the Mechanism for over three years and having experienced at first hand its limitations, the OAU is in the process of developing a carefully defined plan with a clear synergy in the priorities defined and based on a careful selection of an integrated set of capabilities as well as the partnerships which the organization would need to develop. As is well known, the OAU is re-examining the adequacy of its present structures to meet the challenges at hand. In this new attempt to re-order our priorities and make the

Mechanism more responsive to the challenges that confront the Organization, the [focus of attention would include the following:

- the development of an efficient institutional capacity within the OAU for a more enhanced decision-making process and for a more effective conflict prevention and management activities, as well as peace support operations, within the framework of the Mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution;

- the development of a conflict prevention strategy that integrates effective information and early warning machinery. The challenge for the Organization in this area, lies in the extent to which such an early warning system can bridge the distance between effective information gathering, analysis and early action. As envisaged, such a system should be structured in such a way that information emanating from member states, sub regional and international organizations, especially, the UN system, would be fed into and utilized by the OAU as a complement to our information network and to inform decision making. In this regard, the OAU system should be able to access information that is available in the Data Banks of the sub regional organizations and to feed information back to these bodies, for their own strategic planning. Regrettably, early warning like conflict management is becoming a fad. We need to move beyond just talking about early warning, to developing a system that can be used to trigger an effective response at the appropriate time. The value of any information lies in the extent to which it can be used. In this regard, the early warning mechanism that we are now trying to establish, is a system of information that would do the following: provide an efficient trigger for quick and adequate action in conflicts or impending conflicts situations; serve as a continuous source of vital information on an ongoing basis, during crisis and throughout three stages of conflict management that is the peacemaking and preventive stage, the peacekeeping and peace operational stages and the post conflict peace building stage; serve as a data bank of information vital for enhancing the overall work of the Mechanism.

In the immediate future and arising from lessons learnt and the experiences that we have gained from operating the Mechanism, we believe that our short and medium term objectives should also include the following:

- developing a system wide capacity to gather, maintain, update and analyse information on the immediate and the root causes of conflicts in Africa. This will include all social, economic, political, ethnographic, humanitarian crises, environmental and military indicators and factors that can impact on the security of African states in the future; developing and maintaining relationships with a network of organizations, institutions and individuals from which the OAU will pool information and analytic views on an ongoing basis. Such arrangements could also serve as implementing agencies and partners for the OAU;
- strengthening the role of civil society organizations and capacity building for democratic governance and the development of a culture of tolerance, especially in multi ethnic societies; promoting reforms in support of peace, stability and sustainable development, especially, in the area of the transition to and consolidation of democracy through the building of and sustaining the institutions that will strengthen and sustain democracy, monitoring democratic processes, electoral assistance and advocacy of norms;
- promoting new initiatives that will enhance the legitimacy, effectiveness and even-handedness of the security apparatus, including the police and the army, as well as the judiciary; designing post conflict peace building activities to consolidate the peace after a political settlement in a conflict situation. Such activities should include preventive actions like electoral and human rights monitoring, electoral organization and supervision, demobilization programs, strengthening of institutions of state and civil society, promoting an effective long term constitutional dispensation that establishes a workable distribution of power, and socio-economic and rehabilitation measures that address the root causes of conflicts. As the situation in many countries like Sierra Leone and The Comoros has demonstrated, Peace building activities in the aftermath of a political settlement can help in consolidating the peace and thereby prevent a return to violence. The fact that peace building measures in the aftermath of violence closely mirror preventive measures undertaken to avert the resort to violence by conflicting parties highlights the circularity of the process of conflict management. It is becoming increasingly clear, that the tools and procedures that are used in support of preventing violent conflict can also be effectively used to consolidate peace processes in the aftermath of a political settlement.

As indicated earlier, the issues raised in this paper are by no means exhaustive. These are some of the experiences of the Organization of African Unity in dealing with conflict situations in the African Continent. We, at the OAU, are striving to focus our attention on preventive action but this task is not an easy one. Indeed, it is not always easy to find an entry point to allow OAU's action to prevent conflicts, particularly those within Member States since OAU's role is predicated upon the co-operation of concerned Member States. Furthermore, our efforts are undermined by insufficient information gathering and analysis capacity. That is why as I have indicated earlier, in co-operation with our partners within the international community, we are trying to establish, within the OAU, an Early Warning System which could support OAU's efforts at conflict anticipation and prevention.

Another objective in which we strongly believe is the need for international partnership in assuring our institutional responsibilities in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. From our experience, we know that efforts by individual institutions are not enough to address conflict situations. Invariably, concerted efforts are needed to maximize chances for success in conflict prevention action. We, at the OAU, are therefore advocating for the building of a strong partnership between the various actors in preventive advantage and collective effort. It is in that spirit that the OAU has been working closely with regional organizations such as the ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD in the Continent in what we consider as a joint venture for peace. It is also in that spirit of partnership and solidarity that we co-operate and shall continue to co-operate with the United Nations and with other partners within the international community.



THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

**OPENING ADDRESS BY H.E YOWERI KAGUTA MUSEVENI  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA AT THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION  
WORKSHOP.**

ARUSHA, Tanzania 21 ST JANUARY, 1998



Your Excellency Benjamin Mkapa;

Your Excellencies;

Ladies and Gentlemen

## CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

### The pre-colonial Conflicts

At the beginning of 1500 A.D, Conflicts in Central Africa were characterized, in the main, by tribal raids for cattle and women rather by wars of conquest. There were some efforts of Empire building in the Great Lakes areas (the Bachwezi-Batembuzi Kingdoms). The durability of such political entities was, however, compromised by poor mobility of the centralized authorities because of the absent of the horse on account of tsetse flies and Small populations due to the diseases that thrived in the tropics.

With Small populations and poor mobility the ability to sustain large scale political units was impaired. Hence, many of the conflicts were mere raids for cattle, women and even slaves (Abahuku) and maids. The raids by Ntare V OF Ankole in around 1894 into Rwanda and the counraid by Kigeri IV Rwabugiri of Rwanda into Ankole in the same year fell into this category. The raid by Bachwa, son of Mutambuka, into Makara (Congo) in the 1870s, again, falls into this category. In that raid, for instance, a young girl known as Kibooga was captured as a Muzaana (maid). Since she was beautiful, she was, eventually, married by Mutambuka, the king of Ankole. She produced Ntare V, Rusingiza, that became the king Ankole until his death in 1895.

In some areas of Central Africa, we also had wars of succession. In this respect I can quote, again, the wars between Ntare and his half brothers, Mukwenda and Muhikira and the one between Kabalesa and Xabugumire of Bunyoro in the year 1871. At this point I would like to quote the exemplary case of Buganda where succession wars were burnished after the one between Jjunju and Semahokiro in 1771. The Baganda clan leaders, 52 of them, decided that, thereafter, the upbringing of the Princes would no longer be the responsibility of the Kabaka or of their mothers. It would, instead, be the responsibility of a designated State official, Kasujja of the Ngonge clan. He would be the mukuza (Guardian) of all the princes. In order to ensure that none of the princes would be a rallying point for faction formation, all princes were confined by Kasujja in the amphitheater (Olunnya) in Mpigi. Everything they needed was provided for them there. However the princes paid for this through isolation from all the members of the public, including their mothers. They would only deal with Kasujja and their wives and pages. When the Kabaka died, he would not indicate a successor. He would depart in peace, Then the Council of Clan Leaders would meet and they would ask Kasujja to "present his children" - the Princes (Okwaujula abaana be). Kasujja would go through the qualities of the Princes. This one is "kind", the other one is "**cruel**" (**Mukambwe** the other is lay (Munafu) etc. The clans Council would, then, make decision by voting. The day after, the public would be assembled. The job of announcing the king would be done by another State official, Mugema of the Nkima Clan. Mugema, however, would have to invoke the authority of God (Lubaale) in order to have the nominee of the Clan Council accepted by the Public.

To the public it had to appear that the King had been nominated by Lubaale (God) and not by the Clan Council, reverence to the Clan Council notwithstanding.

Hence, all the princes would be lined in full view of the public. Mugema would, then move up and down the line waiting for "Lubaale" to indicate to him which of the princes was suitable to be king. After several laps of moving up and down, "Lubaale" would guide Mugema to the prince that had been agreed upon by Clan Council the previous day. Such Lubaale-guided king - hunts were not without their drama and tragedies. It is said that when Kabaka Ssuuna died in 1854, the clan leaders' Council, as the traditional had been established, convened to elect a

new king. During the conclave of the previous day, they agreed on a certain name. Some of the clan leaders departed; Those who remained, however, developed second thoughts about the name. They had agreed on and, instead, they settled on Mukabya Mutesa I. They must have been the majority.

When Mugena, therefore, guided by « Lubaale » settled on the latter nominee, Mutesa I, the ones who had departed protested loudly that it was the other one and not Mutesa. Mugena ignored the protests and went ahead with the enthronement, but Mutesa had noted these chiefs that had protested.

When he was on the throne he ensured that they were all put to death, hence, the name of Mukabya (the one who makes people weep)

Therefore, in the Great Lakes Area we have both examples of untamed succession wars as in the case of Ankole, Bunyoro and Rwanda by the 1800 s and a completely disciplined succession mechanism as in the case of Buganda. It is therefore, important for us to note that the Baganda had successfully banished wars of succession from their system ever since the 1771 war between Semakokiro and Junju. Succession wars were re-introduced by the British in late 1880s.

The other source of conflict was due to population migrations. Around 1500 and after, there were conflicts when the peoples were moving into Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania from Southern Sudan. These, however, died down and the new comers were either assimilated or they became good neighbours.

#### Contacts with the Outside World:

The most destructive conflicts were those caused by slave trade. Even slave trading Empires of spheres of influence grew out of European guns fueling Conquest in order to get slaves. We have the examples of Lunda- luba Empire and of the exploits of Tipu Tipu in Katanga.

In terms of human hemorrhage, this was most destructive. Renee Domont his False Start in Africa, estimates that as many as 50 million Africans perished in slavery. Therefore, of all the pre-colonial African conflict the most destructive were the slave wars. The others were occasional and short-lived disturbances. Even the Shaka and Ngoni wars seem to have been sparked off by the arrival of the Whites at the Cape

The Zulu clans which had hitherto not been centralised, woke up to the need of Centralization in order to confront the Whites who started colonising the cape in 1652. As is well know, n there was an upsurge of migration and conflict sparked off by these efforts of building a Centralized state out of a fraternity of independent kin clans of the Xhosa Zulu speaking peoples of southern Africa. I, therefore, reiterate that the African conflicts of the pre-colonial times were rather begin and short-lived. In most of them, there was no record of genocide. It was to capture cattle and women. Were not killed but married. As far as the men were concerned, it would, probably, be the conquered chiefs that would be killed but not the ordinary people. Mutambuka caused the killing of the king of Karagwe, possibly Ndagara, but there was no killing of any significant number of Banyambo.Mutambuka, again, caused the killing of Inshansa of kooki, but there was no significant number of ordinary Bakooki killed. Therefore, these purely African pre-colonial conflicts were short-lived raids, punitive expeditions or successions wars with either economic (cattle raids) or political (succession wars) motives.

What, then, characterized colonial fuelled African Conflicts? We have seen that before the 1880 Berlin Conference, two types of wars were engineered among Africans by the imperialists: The slaves trade wars and the Ngoni wars which, I think, were precipitated by the arrival of the colonialists at the Cape as I pointed out above. Then there were the wars of Resistance against colonialism after the Berlin conference.

In a period of almost 400 years from 1898 to 1880, the European invaders slowly nibbled at the independence of Africa from their coastal trading and slaving stations: Zanzibar, Sofala, Mombassa, Luanda, lagos, Cotonou, Gore island, etc. In 1498, when Vasco Da Gama rounded

the Cape of Good hope, the Europeans did not have the strength to conquer the continent: No Steam engine; no breech - loaders but muzzle loaders; and no automatic rifles; no quinine etc. They therefore stayed at the coast and relied on Black on Black wars to get what they needed, Slaves, ivory, gold etc.

By 1880, they had, through technological improvement, overcome their Constraints. As the invaders were resolving their constraints, the Africans, through the greed of the African Chiefs n were engaged in fratricidal conflicts on behalf of the foreign slaves. As an example, the Kingdom of the Bakongo had been destroyed. Some of the successor kingdoms were to implement the slave trade and not to stop it.

In spite of the improved technology of the whites and in spite of the myopia and agreed of the African Chiefs, many African peoples put up Resistance. The hehe, the Kalenjin, the Banyoro, the Shona, the ndebele, the Somalis; the herero, The Zulus, the Ashant etc. Since the African continent was divided politically, this Resistance was defeated one by one. The Ethiopians n however defeated the Italians completely in 1896.

#### Wars of National Liberation:

One other type of conflict. was the Wars of National Liberation. While much of The decolonisation in Africa was pescaful, many of the colonia powers having -drawn appropriate lessons from the anti-colonial wars in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, the massive independence movement in India, Kenya and Algeria, a few were foolish enough to ignore this « Wind of Change ». Among the few were the Portuguese, the Settler Regim in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the racist whites in south Africa and Namibi. These wars were legitimate and cleansing.

They had solidarity form the whole of progressive Africa and from the Socialist camp. They resulted into the independence of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, Namibia and majority rule in south Africa. They were laudable, principled and necessary and they propelled Africa to a higher level of freedom.

### Colonial Manipulation:

After conquest, the Europeans had to rely on manipulation: divide and rule. In Uganda they pitted Baganda against other Ugandans; Catholic versus Protestants, Christians against Moslems; Nilotics against Bantu etc. In Rwanda and Burundi they promoted Hutu -Tutsi conflict; in Angola suspicion between the Mbundus and Ovimbundu; in Mozambique suspicions between Makua and other or trying to isolate the Makonde etc.

These rivalries have resulted into open conflicts in many areas. Biafr versus Nigeria; Angola; violence in Kwazulu; violence in Matebele land succession wars, religious wars and in more recent times after colonial civil wars as far as Uganda is concerned; the conflict in Angola, the conflicts and genocide in Rwanda, the conflicts and genocide in Burundi etc. The primary interest these rivalries, conflicts or genocide serve is colonial interest. The ways the conflicts are executed are complete at variance with the African traditions of the known past. As I told you above, genocide is completely in African. Yet inside completely obscurantism ideology in, for instance, the Great lakes. Some of the highly integrated, specialized and civilized societies of the Great Lakes are now the epitome of disaster and disintegration thanks to this obscurantism. We have now witnesses incredible blood letting in Rwanda and Burundi because or « ethnic » differences. What are these ethnic groups and how are they different from each other?

## The Social Structure in the Great Lakes Region

(The Ankole Example)

Instead of talking about Rwanda and Burundi, I will talk about Ankole which had a similar social structure. What they call « ethnic » groups are in fact more akin to occupational guilds based on job specialisation Agriculturists, cattle keepers and rulers in the case of Ankole and in the case of Rwanda -Burundi do not forget to add a fourth group.

The hunter-gatherers-the Batwa (Pygmy-like).In the case of Ankole these were known as Bairu (cultivators), Bahima (cattle-Keepers) and Bahinda (rulers). IF a Muhima lost cattle, he would be a Murasi and, eventually, become a Mwiru, if a Mwiru acquired cattle, he would become a Mwambari and, eventually, became a Muhima.

None to those two, however, would ever become a Muhinda. Bahinda were the rulers and they monopolised political power. The Bahinda did recruit war-lords from among the Bahima and Bairu depending on the talents of individuals. Ultimate power, however, resided in the Bahinda. Nevertheless, one should not forget that the Bahinda are a new dynasty going back for only 36 generations, starting around 1500 AD. Yet the society itself is very old.

What, then, were the characteristic relations in such a society? Were they parasitic relations among the Banyankore Society were symbiotic or parasitic, apart from the KNOWLEDGE of History in our possession.

We need to go to language and capture the words that characterized the exchange of goods and services between the specialised group and within them. The cattle-Keepers exchange of products with cultivators was called okichurika (barter-trade). This specifically meant exchange of food-stuffs (especially milled and bananas for cattle-keepers did not eat most of the others goods) and perfumeries (ebibaya, orweju, etc..)

If it were other items like pottery (engyemeko, Rukome, enyabya,, ebichuba, etc..) milk-pots (ebyanzi, enkongoro), wooden watering-bucket (amachuba) wooden bowls (entatika),

iron items (amachumu, emihoro, empango, ruraara, orumwaiso, enyerere etc...) Or copper items (emiringa), another word would be used -Okubuzya (hawking) Okubuzya would result in okugura (purchase). If it was beer, whether of bananas (amaar or rwaagwa) or millet/sorghum (omulaba), the term of exchange was okushengyeera. If beer was not sold but just given in form of a party it was called okutereaka. If, on the other hand, beer or other food items were sent as gifts, it was called Okuzinduka. If a cattle -keeper sent beef to a friend, cultivator or otherwise, it was called okutsiira. All these and more were terms of exchange or gifts among equals within the specialized groups or between them. All these words conclusively prove that between the common bahima and Bairu (I.E those not elevated by the rulers to position of war-lords) the relations were symbiotic without any doubt. While the relations in exchange of goods and services were completely symbiotic and on equal basis, there would sometimes be mutual prejudice between these two groups in terms of attitudes.

This however, did not affect the equality of the two in terms of exchange.

Our rich language, determined not to leave any shadow of doubt, provides completely different words for exchange between the commoners (Bahima) and the rulers (Bahinda /Bashambo or the commoners they elevated to position of war-lords).

The categories of rulers were precisely described by our language Omugabe (the king); Enganzi (Prime Minister); Omukuru w'oumtwe (regimental/Commanders) Omwinginya/Omurangira (Prince); Omwigarire (Queen) Rubaga (official sister and co-ruler); Omumbaija (any other sister of the king); Nyamashore (the queen -moter) etc. The terms of exchange between the commoners and any of these categories were very different from those applying among commoners. Here, one begins with giving of Okutoija (pay tribute). Tribute itself is called emitoijo. It is clear that there is no exchange here. The recipient may or may not reciprocate. If he reciprocates, it would be called Okugaba (to donate). The king may okunyaga (confiscate) a commoner's property because he is not happy with him. He may also Kunogora the cattle of the commoner (partial confiscation). He may also kutangisa (to fine) etc. The relations between the ruled and the rulers were clearly parasitic. Therefore, any progressive force

seeking reform would have noted the symbiotic relations with satisfaction and would have concentrate on eliminating the parasitic relations: Okunyaga, okunogora, Okutoija. However, you all have been hearing that there are conflicts between the cattlekeepers and the cultivators in the Great lakes areas: Bairubahima, Bahutu-Batutsi, etc. Where these conflicts are, it is not in search of social justice but as a consequence of colonial manipulator. If you look into the past, any progressive polarization of social interesting where parasites relation still persisted, would have seen the common Bahima and common Bairu forming a common front to resist the parasitism of Bahinda/Bashambo and the commoners they would have elevated to state positions Engazi (war lord) etc.

All this, however, was before colonization. With the onset of colonialism completely new relations came into force. In Ankole the Bristis introduced Nvuma laws (inviolability of property rights) in 1905 in order to punish the Ankole Chiefs for Killing Galt, the British PCgor Western Province. In Rwanda, the Obuhakye (clientship) was abolshed in the late colonial period by Mwami Rudahigwa. The Buhakye was also abolished in Burundi. The money economy was introduced and selling and buying become the main forms of exchange. People took up paid employment. The main problem remained under-development of the economies as a whole. However, the colonialists introduced a new imbalance: manning the colonial administration at the low levels. Here, following false genetic and cultural arguments, They would, for instance, say that the Tutsi in Rwanda or the Baganda in Uganda are "naturally clever" and, therefore, are good for administration. They would, then, say that the Acholis, the Kurias, the Bambas or the Bangala are "brave naturally" and they should dominate the Army r Police. Of course, the numbers involved were small. By the 1950s, the Ankole are had a population of 500,000 persons and it had about 275 senior and minor chiefs.

Even if one assumed that all of them were from one "ethnic" group how would such a category of people bring marked advantages to the "ethnic" group. The salary of the minor chiefs would be about 80 (USS 10 AT THAT TIME). When you hear the reactionary politicians creating such have in search of "balancing", they are seeking to balance such miserable figures; After independence, of course, the number of state employees increased; The public service of

Uganda today (Army, Civil Service, Teaching Service, etc) IS ONLY 300,000. Uganda, currently with a population of 20 million, will not have its employment problems solved by such miserable figures.

Uganda has now been independent for 36 years. During 22 of those years, our country was led by elements from the North of Uganda who proceeded to fill the army, the police, the intelligence services etc; With personnel from that part of our country; Recently, I asked opinion leaders from that part of our country to show me the "development results" of that "domination" of these services by elements from the North; There were none. Wherever signs of development that there were, were a consequence of private investment by the wanainchi, many of whom have never worked for the Government;

Key issues in conflict resolution:

Therefore, when we talk of conflict resolution, we must address four issues:

- a) Ideology as opposed to obscurantism and Criminal opportunism
- b) The strategic goals of our countries in development terms
- c) Empowerment of the people to ensure inclusion and mechanisms of handling conflicts where they arise.

First, we must reject the sectarian ideology of reactionaries that, as we have seen above, is based on false History and foreign manipulation. We should only work with people who believe in Burundi in Rwanda, in Uganda and in Africa and not with those who believe in sectarianism; The latter must be isolated and suppressed; Sectarianism is nothing but Criminal opportunism, seeking cheap popularity;

Secondly, it will be easier to suppress the reactionaries if we are clear about the long-term goals (strategic) of our country; Will our countries remain backward, pre-industrial societies based on primitive agriculture, exporting a few raw-materials with a preponderant import-

orientation? With such under-development, we shall have plenty of opportunity to fight over « balancing » of jobs in the bureaucracy; Even that will cause the absorption of a Small number of people. If, on the other hand, we do not accept this, then we shall have to take the road that has saved the countries of Europe from stagnation and deprivation. By 1810, the population of U.K was only 10 million people. A man, by the name of Alfred Malthus, was so alarmed that, mourning the disappearance of plagues and pestilence that had kept the population low in previous millennia, he warned that unless people engaged in abstinence, the population which was growing « geometrically » could not keep pace with food production which was only growing « arithmetically ». The population of U.K. is now, not 10, but 56 million and it is more opulent than ever before. What made the difference? Industrialization. This is the way forward for our countries. Holland has only got a land area of 41.000 sq kms but with a population of 16 million people with a lot of affluence. Rwanda and Burundi are actually bigger than Holland in land area by an area of 10.000 sq. km with less population. Many of them are, however, living in poverty. With industrialization, many of the labour force will get jobs.

Thirdly, to avoid conflict we must ensure that the people achieve sovereignty in their respective countries and that there is inclusion in the political process. Although, I have said that employment in Public Service is not important, inclusion in the political process is very vital. Every major group should feel represented in Government. Inclusion in the political process means recognition of people's rights. Human beings do not only need food. « Man shall not be alive by bread alone », said Jesus. Man needs spirituality, needs dignity. Moreover, participating in the political process enables one to influence decisions about development strategies. There must, therefore, be fair, transparent, democratic practices in the Whole of Africa. Although we had elections in 1962, they were massively rigged in spite of the presence of the British. Constituencies were gerrymandered; instead of using a single ballot box and single ballot box paper, each political party would have its own ballot box, enabling the UPC to pour acid in the box of DP or switch labels from a full box to an empty one so that somebody could stuff additional illegal papers into a favored ballot box; the counting would not be done immediately after polling and the boxes would be transferred all

the way to district headquarters, thereby allowing for the tampering with the votes, etc. The whole process was completely discredited.

By 1966, even this non-transparent process was « abrogated » by Obote. We were supposed to have had the next elections by 1967. The elections were postponed because of the « exceptional » situation in the country, etc.

As a consequence, the people of Uganda never saw the inside of polling booth for another 18 years (1962-1980). In 1980, instead of Learning from the mistakes of 1966, Obote wove new schemes. Obote and Muwanga refused to amend the Electoral law. The non-transparency and the unfairness of 1962 were resurrected and we were back to square one. How could conflict be avoided in this case?

Finally, there should be mechanisms of conflict resolution in each country and in the region. Within each country a culture of sharing in the security fields by all nationals of the country so that the security organs are trusted by everybody and, where necessary, sharing in the power. In Uganda, we stopped the colonial practice of recruiting army only from certain areas. We gave each district, not each ethnic group a quota to fill in recruiting into the Army. Since 1986, we have been operating a broad-based administration.

As a consequence, although Uganda's problems are not eliminated, we have been able to sustain an average rate of growth of GDP of 6 % for the last eleven years. Ugandan would have performed even better if we had better regional security framework. We have been able to repair important aspects of our economy and social programmes In spite of the insecurity that has been endemic on our borders with Sudan, Rwanda, Congo and Kenya at different times in the last 12 years. There should be a regional pact not to allow insecurity to emanate from any of our countries in order to affect at the neighbours. Additionally, there should be a regional arrangement to prevent the usurpation of the sovereignty of the people of East and Central Africa. If, for instance Obote had been prevented from overthrowing the 1966 Constitution or Amin's Coup had been

suppressed in 1971, Ugandans would have been saved a lot of hemorrhage and the economy would have been saved.

You can not talk of resolving conflicts in the Great Lakes Areas, that is, especially in Rwanda and Burundi without talking of impunity.

The first massacres took place in 1959 under the supervision of the Belgians. The International Community did nothing about this. The Hutu reactionaries, therefore, came to believe that genocide could pay. On the other hand, the Tutsi reactionaries in Burundi, after the nationalist movements leadership had been decapitated through the assassinations of Rwagasore and Ngendandumwe, the Tutsi came to believe that in order to survive Rwanda-type of genocide, they would have to pre-empt Hutu schemes of genocide with their own genocide. It is this permutation of Criminal mishandling that have resulted into the subsequent conflict and catastrophes in Rwanda and Burundi. Therefore, to bring this conflict to an end, anybody guilty of genocide, especially in the role of an author of genocide, must be punished by hanging. Those who say that they no longer believe in Capital punishment must not forget that the crimes committed were Capital Compounded.

This is one area where the law of Moses would help us: « An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth ». If the United Nations does not do this, the Rwanda or Burundi Government does not do it, then the families of the victims will have their own revenge. We are therefore, talking of discipline punishment as opposed to anarchical punishment; Punishment however, must be there and the sooner the better. As far as the majority of the people who were used in the genocide are concerned, other ranges of punishments must be thought about. I am tempted to recollect the traditional blood settlement in Ankole known as « Okukaraba » which involved both paying a heavy fine of cattle and a religious ceremony to Clean the crime.

In resolving this conflict we must remember to rely on credible people that have not tainted themselves in the marky History of the respective countries. Our experience showed that to

try and rely on a tainted person to solve such controversial problems is to indefinitely postpone the solution.

May I end by reiterating that it is incorrect to lump all conflicts together. Some conflicts are justified and principled while others are unjustified and unprincipled. As far as principled conflicts are concerned I can think of two situations:

- a) A defranchised majority, having exhausted all peaceful means, being forced to take up arms as means of last resort;
- b) A minority group being threatened with extermination by any force whether majority or otherwise. Such a group has got every right to defend itself even by force of arms.

### Conclusion

May I recapitulate by saying that the conflicts in the pre-colonial times were in the form of raids for cattle and women; succession wars where there was no mechanism for a smooth process; conflicts resulting from migrations of peoples; conflict caused by the slave trade or the initial encroachment of Europeans, and, later on, wars of Resistance to colonialism. Towards the end of the Colonial era, there were wars of national liberation conflicts resulting from colonial manipulations, as in Rwanda and Burundi, and anti dictatorship wars as in Uganda, Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, etc

Thank you very much.

21 January 1998

Arusha/TZ

STATEMENT BY H.E AMB. ANTONY MNAKYI  
AT THE WORKSHOP ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA,  
ARUSHA, TANZANIA, 21-23 JANUARY, 1998

(Check against delivery)

Mr. Chairman,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

The African continent has experienced and continues to experience brutal and debilitating conflicts. There have been, and there remain under way, several initiatives to resolve these conflicts, to prevent their recurrence and the emergence of new ones. Every initiative that can make a contribution to these efforts must be given every encouragement and support. I salute the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation for their joint sponsorship of the present event and the UNDP and UNIFEM for providing funding for it. To have been requested to take a contribution to this effort is a great privilege and I wish to thank the facilitators for it.

The number of Liberian peace agreements concluded and not honoured by the factions is staggering. The Abuja Agreement that finally ended the conflict was about the 14th in the series of agreements negotiated and concluded since ECOWAS embarked on the mediation effort in 1990. In my short paper I have tried to summarize the obstacles that stood in the way of the implementation of the peace agreements.

In the political area although the lack of political will and commitment on the part of the warring factions to achieve a settlement was a major obstacle, the divisions among the key ECOWAS countries directly involved in Liberia, which supported different factions and failed to form a common policy on Liberia, was the underlying factor which had emboldened the factions in their intransigence. For example the arms embargo was never effective because the factions could always rely on their allies in the sub-region and beyond to ensure that the

supplies kept flowing. The same applied to the economic sanctions. Supporters within the sub-region and outside the region had no scruples trading with their faction allies because they supported them and because there was profit to be made.

These divisions within ECOWAS invariably impacted adversely in various ways on the peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, which had the mandate to oversee the implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreements. The refusal by Charles Taylor and his NPFL faction, which dominated the countryside, to recognise ECOMOG as an impartial and neutral force was a major obstacle to the process. So also was the deep animosity between Taylor and Nigeria. All the facilitators recognised that as long as Taylor, whose faction controlled most of the countryside, and Nigeria, a key player in the process as well as the largest troop contributor to ECOMOG, remained implacable enemies, the impasse in the implementation of the peace agreements could not be broken.

As already indicated, in implementing its mandate ECOMOG faced serious problems of credibility. ECOMOG also lacked the financial, logistic and adequate manpower resources required to carry out its mandate. The major donor countries perceived the peacekeeping force as corruption - ridden, unbalanced in its composition and ineffective. Consequently they were not prepared to respond favourably to the appeals made by both ECOWAS and the UN for financial and logistic support to ECOMOG by making contributions to the Trust Fund for Liberia. The efforts undertaken by the UN Secretary General and other members of the international community, particularly the US, to convince ECOWAS to restructure and strengthen ECOMOG and to strive for a balance of troops, including through troop contributions from other African countries outside the ECOWAS sub-region, were designed to create the confidence necessary for the international community to provide logistic support for ECOMOG. The efforts resulted in the deployment to Liberia in January 1994 of contingents from Tanzania and Uganda as an expanded ECOMOG.

The deployment of expanded ECOMOG was also in response to another problem of credibility that faced ECOMOG. As already mentioned, right from the start of the ECOWAS

initiative, Charles Taylor and his NPFL faction refused to work with ECOMOG disputing its impartiality and neutrality. In particular they refused to disarm to ECOMOG which had the mandate to supervise the process of disarmament and demobilisation. The Tanzanian and Ugandan contingents were therefore, deployed to give confidence to NPFL to disarm.

The most difficult obstacle to overcome was the deep divisions among the ECOWAS countries directly involved in the Liberian peace process and, related to it, the severely strained relations between Taylor and Nigeria. Many initiatives failed to reconcile the differences. The meeting in Accra on 24 January 1995 convened by the Chairman of ECOWAS, and the Abuja Summit meeting of 25 May 1995 convened at the urging of the UN Secretary General, are the most prominent initiatives that failed to harmonise the policies of the ECOWAS countries closely involved in the process. At a lower level there were several equally fruitless initiatives, including personal visits by prominent individuals to the leaders concerned. The break through came with Taylor 's sensational visit to Abuja on 2 June, 1995.

That visit marked a major turning point in the Liberian peace process. The resulting rapprochement facilitated the convening of the meeting that concluded the Abuja Agreement of 19 August 1995, the last in the series in the Liberian peace process. Subsequent developments that impeded or even halted implementation of the agreement, such as the ULIMO-J attack on ECOMOG in Tubmanburg on 28 December 1995 and the April 1996 fighting in Monrovia must be attributed to other causes.

The involvement of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in the Liberian peace process marked the first time the UN had deployed a peacekeeping mission alongside another peacekeeping mission already established by a regional organisation, in this case a sub-regional organisation.

ECOWAS played the leading role in the political negotiations as well as, through ECOMOG, in implementing the military aspects of the agreements. The UN played a supportive role as

did the OAU. Negotiating the Liberian peace agreements has, therefore, been a unique partnership in which ECOWAS and UN were the key international partners.

The cooperation has been a Learning experience for both ECOWAS and the OAU on the one hand, and the UN on the other. It would be interesting to find out how much the entire operation cost. But by all accounts ECOWAS accomplished the task at a fraction of what a United Nations peacekeeping operation would have cost. Such cooperation therefore offers an exciting prospect for the promotion of a more rational and cost-effective division of labour between the UN and regional organisations.

After Liberia, developments elsewhere around the world such as in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, strongly suggest that this is the road for the future. Increasingly countries of a particular region will be expected to play a greater role in keeping the peace in their area. In the political area this is nothing new as those who follow the situation in the Horn of Africa and in the Great Lakes area know. However, moving into the area of peacekeeping will entail Herculean efforts to overcome the many obstacles that stand in the way. Lack of resources is not the only one. The most difficult have to do with national interests and regional rivalries.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, under which the operation in Liberia was carried out, offers an opportunity for the international community to move forward or to remain where we are. In my paper I have stressed the need to ensure that the application of Chapter VIII does not encourage the Security Council to abdicate its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In my view, that responsibility includes ensuring that resources needed for the application of Chapter VIII become available.,

My paper has drawn attention to the need to guard against possible undesirable influences that regional interests may exert in a peacekeeping operation. As a matter of policy the United Nations does not ask neighbouring countries to contribute troops to an operation in their area. The reason is to guard against the temptation of neighbouring countries using

their close-vantage position to skew the process in their favour. No doubt the framers of Chapter VIII weighed the advantages against the disadvantages of regional peacekeeping and decided in their favour. ULIMO was the creation of ECOWAS and there is no dispute about that. There is a dispute about who created the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) and supplied it with arms and ammunition. There is also a dispute about who supplied the remaining factions ( Lofa Defence Force (LDF) Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and ULIMO-J) with arms and ammunition. The debate over this issue suggests that while in the early stages of the conflict the proliferation of warring factions may have served the purpose of some ECOWAS member states, in the latter stages of the war it became a complicating, rather than a facilitating, factor in the peace process.

As already noted the success or failure of the ECOWAS initiative in Liberia depended very much on the support of the international community particularly in providing ECOMOG. with financial and logistic support. That support came with a price. ECOWAS was reluctant to bring in Expanded ECOMOG but restructuring was the price they had to pay for donor support for ECOMOG.

When further support was made available following the adoption of the revised schedule of Implementation of the Abuja Agreement, the donor community was accorded a formal role in the monitoring of the process. A healthy relationship of mutual respect and cooperation replaced a relationship of mutual suspicion and even hostility.

When the History of the Liberian Conflict comes to be written I very much hope that the critical role played by the Mediation Team, particularly in the efforts to secure a cessation of hostilities in Monrovia following the eruption of fighting in the city on 6 April, 1996, will be appropriately acknowledged. Conceived jointly by the Special Representative of the Chairman of ECOWAS and the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General as a mechanism to support the efforts of the Special Envoy of the Chairman of ECOWAS, the Team soon became a regular forum for the exchange of views and the coordination of positions for the international community in Monrovia.

In this regard it became an invaluable tool for monitoring implementation of the peace agreements. During the dark days of death and destruction in Monrovia, that lasted two months, the Team worked tirelessly with the Special Envoy and the two Liberian sides in the fighting to secure a ceasefire, the release of hostages and a return to normalcy. The success of these efforts facilitated the convening of the Committee of Nine meeting that adopted the Accra Mechanism that salvaged the Abuja Agreement. With this success the Team was accorded a role in the Consultative machinery of the Special Envoy of the Chairman of ECOWAS during his many assessment visits to Monrovia.

The Mediation Team's other members were the Ambassadors of Guinea, Sierra Leone and the United States as well as the Resident -Representative of the UNDP and the UNHCR Country Representative. At the beginning the ECOMOG Force Commander was also a member of the Team but he dropped out later.

The forum contributed positively to the process in two other ways. By speaking with one voice it denied our detractors the opportunity to confuse us and to play us off one against another. It also helped to greatly reduce, though not to eliminate, opportunities to advance bilateral agendas.

## **CONCLUSION**

Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana, said that the independence of Ghana was meaningless unless it was linked to the total liberation of Africa.

If he were alive today I believe he would tell us that the peace, security and stability that our nation states claim to enjoy is meaningless unless peace, security and stability become universal on the African continent. Responding to the challenge, ECOWAS, in the face of great odds, set a fine example in regional peacekeeping in Liberia. We owe them appreciation and gratitude for the sacrifice they have made for the cause of peace in Africa.

Thank you for your attention.

**LEARNING FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA**

**WORKSHOP ON THE EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL  
MEDIATORS IN AFRICA CONFLICTS**

**HELD AT ARUSHA TANZANIA**

**21-23 JANUARY, 1998**

**LEARNING FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA THE LIBERIA  
EXPERIENCE**

**PRESENTED BY**

**H.E Ambassador Anthony B.NYAKYI**

**LEARNING FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

**IN AFRICA: THE LIBERIAN EXPERIENCE**

**(ANTHONYB. NYAKYI)**

### **Introduction**

The Liberian conflict has its roots in a history of complex and difficult relationships between the majority indigenous population and the minority settler community, the descendants of freed American slaves. From colonial times through independence in 1847 the majority felt excluded from having a say in the running of their country and sharing in the resources of the country. The military coup d'Etat of 1980 that brought Samuel Doe to power created an opportunity for democratic governance. However, ten years of misrule characterized by a brutal repression of opponents, corruption and a controversial election in 1985 helped to galvanize the forces that brought clown President

Doe's regime in 1990. A total breakdown of law and order as well as of civil authority followed the overthrow of the regime. A brutal and purposeless civil war then ensued, leading to severe casualties and a massive displacement of the population into internal shelters as IDPs and to neighbouring countries as refugees. From two contending parties in **1989** the belligerents had proliferated to seven factions by 1994.

### **Setting precedents**

1. The seven-year long Liberian civil conflict offered Africa and the international community two important precedents in conflict resolution. Until the establishment and deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia in August 1990, Africa's efforts in conflict resolution had been limited mainly to the political area of mediation conciliation and arbitration and dealt principally with interstate disputes. Chad was a unique case of peacekeeping in Africa,

2. With the ECOWAS initiative in Liberia, Africa launched its first major effort in peace-keeping. The Secretary of the OAU has described the occasion of the launching of the initiative as "Africa's finest hour". In turn the initiative provided an opportunity for the international community to create another precedent by bringing into use, for the first time in the United Nations 50-year history, a provision in the UN Charter that had never been used before: Chapter VIII which empowers a regional organization, to undertake a peacekeeping operation on behalf of the international community.

As this short paper Will endeavour to demonstrate these two precedents had far-reaching implications for the Liberian peace process and for future peacekeeping operations on the continent and hopefully beyond. For the sake of Africa and of the UN and indeed of the Whole World it was important that this partnership between the world body and a regional organization that broke new ground in peacekeeping should succeed and be seen to succeed.

### Establishment of ECOMOG

3. The outbreak of the Liberian conflict in December 1989 coincided with the end of the cold war. At the time the international community was preoccupied with the major crises that followed the collapse of the old system with the major powers, in particular, being more concerned with securing their global interests than in intervening to stop internal conflicts that did not seem to have a direct bearing on these interests. Furthermore these conflicts were a new phenomenon and the world had not yet developed a consensus on how to deal with them. It is a matter of speculation as to whether and when the United Nations would have intervened in Somalia if its hand had not been forced by the United States "Operation Save Lives." The conflict had been going on for sometime while the International community watched. The horrifying images that appalled the US, compelling President Bush to order American forces to intervene to protect the delivery humanitarian assistance, were visible for all to see. The fact that in Liberia ECOWAS had moved quickly in an effort to end the fighting removed any pressure there might have been on the UN to initiate action of its own. The international community could therefore take time in deciding what action to take.

4. In addition to these considerations cost was also a major factor in determining the response of the international community to the growing demands for UN action on these conflicts. Although at the time there were in existence only five peacekeeping operations, it was becoming clear already that **the increasing number** of conflicts around the world called for greatly increased resources at a time of a difficult economic environment and tight budgets. With diminishing resources and growing demands the Security Council was therefore reluctant to take on new operations. In addition its operation in Somalia had gone disastrously wrong.

5. Africa on the other hand could not afford to ignore what was happening in Liberia. The countries of the West African sub-region in particular felt constrained to intervene to stop the internecine conflict within their area. The fighting had already resulted in the loss of many lives and destruction of much property in Liberia. It was destabilising neighbouring countries

through the creation of a large refugee population and the spill-over of rebel activity into one neighbouring country and was now threatening to plunge the whole region into turmoil. So while a reluctant Security Council could afford to take its time in considering what to do about Liberia, ECOWAS had no option. Indeed the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence adopted in Freetown in 1981 empowered member states to come to the aid of a member state plagued by a conflict situation such as Liberia was now experiencing.

### **Appeal for UN Support**

6. In terms of the UN Charter responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the Security Council. That is why ECOWAS took it for granted that its intervention in Liberia would readily enjoy the unqualified support of the Security Council. In addition to political and moral support ECOWAS expected substantial financial and logistical support from the international community. ECOWAS had a very sound case and articulated it well: Its intervention in Liberia had been undertaken on behalf of the international community. If it had not intervened the Security Council would have been compelled to act. And ECOWAS had itself already committed substantial resources in manpower, finance and logistics. What it was now seeking from the United Nations was the necessary financing for the operation.

### **Application of Chapter VII of UN Charter**

7. As the debate over what the Security Council could or could not do on Liberia continued it became clear that ECOWAS had been too optimistic in its expectation of immediate financial and Logistic support from the Council. The consultations revealed some interesting differences between ECOWAS and the major players on the Council about the nature of the ECOWAS operation. But the request for Security Council authority under Chapter VII did not pose insurmountable problems. The major problem was over its financing. The Council refused to recommend direct UN funding for an operation that was not under its command and

control. This became a major source of controversy between ECOWAS and the UN and has an important lesson for future peace-keeping operations worldwide. This background is necessary for an understanding and appreciation of the reasons for the establishment of the "Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement on Liberia."

### **Trust Fund for Liberia**

8. A trust fund is a mechanism that the UN has to resort to increasingly to raise resources for a cause which enjoys general support but which cannot be funded from assessed contributions usually on account of strong objections from some of the major contributors. By their very nature trust funds seldom attract adequate resources. And so it has been with the Trust Fund for Liberia. In seven years it raised just under US 525.0 million nearly 90% of which was earmarked by the contributors for specific non-ECOWAS beneficiaries. Of the remaining 10% USS 1.0 million or approximately 4.0% was earmarked for humanitarian needs, leaving only 6.0% or approximately USS 1.5 unallocated and therefore available to ECOMOG to use as it saw fit. Thus from the outset, ECOMOG failed to attract the support it badly needed to succeed.

### **Pledging Conference on support for Liberia**

9. In a bid to improve the situation the UN Secretary General organized a Special Conference on Support for Liberia in New York in October 1995 which, in order to demonstrate the importance he attached to it, he proposed be co-chaired by himself and the Chairman of ECOWAS. Significantly, in the course of the preparatory stage the focus of the conference shifted from support for ECOMOG to general support for Liberia. The change was made after it became clear that while there was a willingness to provide assistance for Liberia for humanitarian and other needs there was little support for the appeal for assistance for ECOMOG. Once again the outcome followed the same pattern-substantial support for humanitarian needs but little support for ECOMOG. Although the conference raised

substantial resources (US\$ 145.7 million only US\$ 10.0 million was pledged for ECOMOG and this by only one donor, significantly the United States.

### **Other Initiatives to Mobilise resources for Liberia**

10. Initially the International Contact Group for Liberia ((ICGL), which was specifically created to breathe new life into the efforts to mobilise financial and logistic support for ECOMOG did not result in the expected immediate improvement in the situation. As a political forum to sensitise the donor community about the need to support the peace process, it was useful. But it added little to the resources available to the peacekeeping force. Only after it was enlarged and restructured to bring in fresh ideas from the donor community as well as the ECOWAS sub-region did the much awaited improvement begin to show.

11. The acquisition by ECOMOG of the long awaited transport, communication equipment and other logistic requirements made a dramatic improvement in the peace process. Overnight ECOMOG's morale shot up. Even before it had received the additional troops it considered necessary for a successful disarmament operation, ECOMOG felt confident enough to deploy extensively in readiness for disarmament and demobilisation. From then on the peace process moved forward apace to the final phase of the electoral process which concluded with the election itself in July 1997.

12 I have dwelt on the question of support for ECOMOG because it was unquestionably central to the efforts to implement the Liberian peace process. For ECOWAS it was what they required from the international community to resolve the conflict. The latter took a long time to develop a consensus on the kind of support the peculiar Liberian operation required in order to succeed. It is resources or lack of them that determined the size, quality and performance of the peacekeeping force. It has been said that ECOMOG suffered a humiliation at the hands of ULIMO-J in Tubmanburg in December 1995 because it deployed too thinly and prematurely. While the observation is true, it ignores the reality on the "round at the time. There was nothing on the horizon to show that the additional troops that had been pledged for

ECOMOG were forthcoming. Yet in accordance with the schedule of implementation of the Abuja Agreement ECOMOG was expected to start disarmament and demobilisation.

### **Other factors impacting on the peace process**

13. According to ECOWAS lack of resources was the single most important factor that determined the success or failure of the ECOWAS initiative. There were, however, other important factors which impacted on the process and I would now like very briefly to touch upon four of them: Cooperation of the parties concerned, impartiality of the peacekeeping force; regional and external interests; preoccupation with the problem of setting a precedent.

### **Cooperation of the parties and Impartiality of the peacekeeping force**

14. At the start of the conflict the contending forces were two Liberian sides: the Armed forces of Liberia (AFL) defending the Government and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) fighting to overthrow the Government. In a classical UN peacekeeping operation two preconditions must be satisfied before a peacekeeping force can be deployed. The first requires that the contending forces must agree on a ceasefire. The second requires unqualified acceptance by the belligerents of an impartial third party to monitor the ceasefire and, (if the agreement so provides) to keep the opposing sides apart. These conditions were never satisfied initially in the case of the ECOWAS initiative in Liberia. Right from the start the NPFL rejected both the call for a ceasefire and the deployment of ECOMOG, arguing that the force was not an impartial peacekeeping force.

15. The dispute over the impartiality of ECOMOG subsequently led to agreement to bring in two important partners in the process. In accordance with the stipulation of the Cotonou and subsequent agreements primary responsibility for the implementation of the military aspects lay with ECOMOG. The establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission for Liberia (UNOMIL) in September 1993 was prompted by the demand, among others, for an impartial third party to observe and monitor the implementation procedures in order to verify their

impartial application (See Annex I for a summary of the functions of UNOMIL as provided for in the various agreements and mandated by the Security Council). Similarly the Expanded ECOMOG contingents from Tanzania and Uganda were deployed in January 1994 specifically to assist with disarmament and demobilisation. NPFL had refused to disarm to ECOMOG but had indicated its readiness to disarm to an impartial third party.

### **Regional interest**

16. Rival regional interests dogged the peace process for much of the lifetime of the conflict. In theory the ECOWAS initiative enjoyed the support of all the 16 member states of ECOWAS. In reality only 6 countries - Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Mali, and, for a short while, Senegal - made troops available to the peacekeeping force. Some opposed the operation in Principe because they saw it as serving the interests of their rivals in the sub-region. In short they did not all see eye to eye on how to resolve the conflict. While all agreed to work to end the conflict they failed to get their act together and often found themselves supporting rival functions. That is why the United Nations Secretary General placed great importance on the imperative for the countries of the region to meet in order to harmonize their policies on Liberia.

### **External interests**

17. ECOWAS's external partners had their own ideas about who was right and who was wrong among the rival Liberian factions and their supporters in the subregion as well as on the conduct of the operation. These ideas influenced their decisions. The reason why at the beginning ECOMOG was denied the resources it needed to do its work had more to do with the attitude of these partners towards ECOMOG and towards some member states of the sub-region than with the hard times the world had been going through or the suggestion that the problem of command and control could not be satisfactorily addressed. All these reasons were laid aside when the partners in the process reached a consensus on the way forward in the Conference to Support the Liberian Peace Process.

18. Fear of setting a precedent was the major reason advanced for the inability of the UN to provide direct funding for the ECO9VAS operation. There may well be a genuine fear on the part of some UN member states that the proliferation of conflicts around the world in the post cold-war period places an unacceptable -burden on them at a time of tight budgets. But it was a convenient scapegoat for those who had different ideas about the crisis and were not yet ready to provide resources.

19. My argument always has been that what is worth doing is worth doing well. In supporting direct UN funding I argued that since this was the first time Chapter VIII was being applied, whatever the United Nations did it was setting a precedent. If it allocated adequate resources which enabled ECOWAS to shorten and resolve the conflict it would have set a good precedent for the application of Chapter VIII. If it failed to do so and this first application of Chapter VIII was perceived to have been a failure the UN would have set a bad precedent. It is clear what the choice should be.

## **Lessons Learned**

### **Financing of regional peacekeeping**

20. The Liberian experience and developments elsewhere suggest that increasingly the burden of resolving regional conflicts and of maintaining peace and security in these areas will fall on the countries closest to the conflict areas with the international community, through the Security Council, maintaining a supportive role over the operation. This seems to be the trend regarding the conflicts in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. For the countries of a particular region to be more concerned and more closely involved in the search for a solution than countries further afield is quite natural. The danger, though, is that this could lead to the Security Council abdicating its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. There is also the danger that, using their close vantage position, neighbouring countries could exert undue influence on the process. The challenge therefore is to ensure that:

- Whatever is done is done on behalf of the international community and has the covering authority of the Security Council,

- All possible measures are taken to avoid undue influence by neighbouring countries,

- Member states with the ability to do the job but lack the necessary resources to accomplish the task are provided with the resources. This may entail adopting a differential approach in which operations qualify for direct funding and which do not. I believe a set of criteria to be applied can be developed. The trust fund route is not a reliable mechanism for financing peacekeeping and is an excuse for postponing a decision on an important and urgent matter.

#### A COMMON POLICY

21. The Liberian experience also shows that when the regional partners in a process fail to get their act together they lay themselves open to manipulation by both internal as well as external forces. The nature of conflicts is such that rivals will always find internal as well as external allies. Their opposing interests will always militate against the common desire to work together for peace. For the United Nations the harmonisation of the policies of the ECOWS member states and Liberia was the single most important requirement of the process. It took precedence over the search for resources for ECOMOG.

#### Equity and balance in representation

22. Although in theory all partners in an operation are equal, in practice and reality they wield differing influences. Every effort should be made to achieve equity and balance when putting together a peace-keeping force. In particular care should be taken to avoid or minimise the domination of the process by the most powerful partner. The Liberia experience shows that if these ideals are kept constantly in view with tact, sympathy and understanding people will listen. Banging the table or shouting only serves to aggravate the situation.

### Influence over the process

23. A related lesson is a reminder of the well-known saying that « he who pays the piper calls the tune » ECOWAS'S external partners who concentrated on castigating ECOMOG while ignoring its needs found themselves with little influence over the process. The picture changed dramatically after they extended assistance to ECOMOG. Indeed as a result ECOWAS accorded them a formal role in the monitoring of the implementation of the Abuja Agreement. The relationship changed from being chilly and even hostile to one of mutual confidence and support.

### Mandate of the United Nations Observer

#### Mission to Liberia (UNOMIL)

24. As already stated Liberia was the UN's first experience in applying chapter VIII of the UN charter VIII of the UN charter. Understandably defining the mandate of the Mission was not easy and UNOMIL's role was often misunderstood both by our Liberian and ECOWAS and ECOMOG partners. Liberians constantly criticized UNOMIL for not providing the kind of assistance to Liberia that the UN had provided in Somalia, Angola, Cambodia and Bosnia. ECOWAS and ECOMOG could not understand why UNOMIL was not providing direct logistic and financial support to ECOMOG. They believed that this was what UNOMIL was in Liberia for. Surprisingly even high ranking officials of some important member states that played a key role in the Liberia peace process did not have a full understanding of the nature of the UN's mission in Liberia and consequently often dispatched erroneous reports to their governments. It took a lot of time and effort to get the Liberian Government and faction leaders and the public generally as well as ECOWAS and ECOMOG to gradually understand the nature and role of the UN's mission in Liberia.

### Primary responsibility for the process

25. An interesting aspect of this discussion on the mandate of UNOMIL is the pride and jealousy with which ECOWAS and ECOMOG guarded their mission in Liberia. The UN did not at anytime contemplate taking over the process from ECOWAS. But in moments of frustration over the stalemate, individuals sometimes hinted that it was time the UN took over. Understandably ECOWAS and ECOMOG were always deeply offended by such hints. The idea that after all the sacrifice in lives and resources which ECOWAS had invested in the process someone else should take over was repugnant. That is why all the time ECOWAS made sure that all their partners never forgot who was in the driving seat. Any partner who suggested or acted in ways that suggested otherwise was promptly called to order even if this meant forfeiting much-needed financial and logistic support. Those who castigated the UN for not taking charge of the process can be forgiven for their ignorance of the nature of the two missions.

**LEARNING FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA**

**WORKSHOP ON THE EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL  
MEDIATORS ON AFRICAN CONFLICTS**

**21-23 JANUARY 1998**

**National Movement for the promotion of peace and National Unity MNFPUN**

**P.O Box 879 BAMAKO**

**BEST PRACTICES FOR WOMEN IN THE FIELD OF PEACE BUILDING  
EDUCATION FOR PEACE PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT**

# **THE CASE OF MALIAN WOMEN**

**BY**

**DR. Mariam Djibrilla MAIGA**

**MNFPUN Chairperson**

## **1.CONTEXTE AND PRESENTATION**

The MNFPUN was established on 25 th October 1991 by decree NO 1122/MATDB -CAB following the outbreak of internal armed conflict in 1990 in the North of Mali, generally referred to as Toured conflict;

The will and commitment of the women who participated in the Mali National Conference enabled them to recognise and analyse the political and socio-economic stakes of the conflict; In this regard; They decided to establish MNFPUN which is a national organisation with majority representation in the areas affected by the conflict.

The initiators dwelt ont the following:

1.Sensitizing women motivation as well as their participation in conflict management

2.Strengthening of social cohesion:

3.Underling actions geared to wards promoting national unity

The structure of MNFPUN is as follows:

- 1.General Assembly
- 2.Executive Bureau
- 3.working Committees
- 4.Regional offices
- 5.Regions district and wards village committees

The Movement has the fooling objectives:

i; To contribute effectively to the restoration of peace as well as consolidation of cohesion and the social fabric between various communities;

ii. To encourage the return of refugees and displaced persons through assistance and confidence building mechanisms armed specifically at women who are victims of the conflict and its consequences:

iii. To detect and fight against rumours and subversive ideas geared forwards escalating the hostilities;

However, there emerged a reverse of the situation; Due to dynamism resulting into the settlement of conflict, there emerged the Malian experience of crisis management requiring the involvement of the civil society in order to diffuse the crisis;

What were the best methods and innovations adopted by the civil society in order to settle the conflict and what was the women's contribution?

2.2 Contribution of Malian women to crisis management; Settlement of conflict and consolidation of peace;

2.2.1 Mobilization and promotion of infra and inter societal values and norms in order to patch up the social fabric torn apart by the conflict and restore social cohesion (softening of hearts and easing tension) are the strong and touchy values concerning the right groups in various communities;

The existence of a cultural tradition of women having a bigger say in the family and in societies not actually publicly shown, but weigh heavily in terms of influence: the peculiarity of the site of Tossaye in the North of Mali is the origin of the legend whose theme bases itself on the intimacy of sedentary fraternal relations and of the Touareg in the North made by this mother who gave birth to a sedentary and Touareg each one of them being part of her rib founded her respective kingdom and set on conquering new lands up to the day when their paths crossed each other. Upon failing to agree with each other on the patch of land conquered; They decided to fight each other; Their mother being all powerful and merciful, lifted her right breast and asked them to put an end to fratricidal violence; None of them heeded to their mother's plea; God punished them by transforming them into stones so as to serve as a lesson to the future generation.

On the other hand the blessings of a mother manifest themselves through certain dimensions and behaviours of the children brought into the world by herself; A woman with a chest full of blood feeds her child by her own breast milk, source of like tenderness and affection; Likewise irrespective of the gravity of a family or inter-community crisis whose mankind constitutes the principal player the women's intervention must compulsorily make the parties to the conflict reconsider their positions and advocate peace; This symbolic value permanently exists among nomadic and settled communities;

Cousinship is born between the children of a brother and those of a sister sharing the same parents or between community. At the family level, it attributes the capacity of saying anything, take anything, do anything or receive anything from that cousin. At the social level, it

is an individual who within the society plays a balancing role inside a network or organization. The Consinship is a catalyst element of crisis.

### **Songs, flourishing poetry and other recitals**

Being symbolic they were used to glorify the actions geared towards peace and fight against rumours.

Malian tradition of creating and resolution of conflicts without external mediators and the mutual consciousness of good mastery of strength and weaknesses of each community and pact have contributed to develop some moral qualities and a code of conduct.

2.2.2. The organization of debates broadcast live over the radio regarding the role of a civil society in the prevention and management of conflicts.

2.2.3. The technics and tools of settlement used by women

Sensitization of various protagonists an societal norms and values governing inter-community relation through:

i. Conception mounting and dissemination of message pertinent to peace and solidarity affecting the unprivileged groups of the population (widows, orphans reconciliation, national unity ) in all national languages.

i.i Glorifying poetry and positives songs enhancing deeds and behaviours favourable to peace.

i.i.i Sound management of rumours sowing seeds of discord and pollution benefiting the enemies of peace.

- xvii. Educating women on international human rights:
- xviii. Peace missions to areas affected by the conflict.

#### 2.2.4 Lessons to draw

Some tools for conflict management and mobilization of societal values and norms.

Strong cultural inter-dependence and socio-economic traditions symbolize a permanent factor between the communities having a strong will of tolerance and forgiveness:

The preponderant role of the high status of the woman which she cannot be denied irrespective of the gravity and complexity of a crisis in her capacity as a source of life factor of peace she has been able to mobilize preserve and promote the societal values and norms that govern the intra/inter community relations.

Negotiations is done on the basis of mastering the values and perceptions of various protagonists as well as listening with respect and consideration each one of them and never minimize an internal armed conflict.

Know better various protagonists and their supporters: understand their perceptions their fears and their needs which are often characterized by nuances.

Know better various protagonists and their supporters understand their perceptions their fears and their needs which are often characterized by nuances.

Know better the positions of each party in the event of disagreement in order to avoid wastage and look for alternatives in relation to their positions elaborate and make a deep analysis before going to a negotiating table.

Analyse the interests of each party understand the risks which might be encountered and objectives to be attained as well as possible solutions (creative options) by one of the parties when the other remains stuck on its positions.

Analyse objective and fair reasons (legitimate criteria) justifying these options and have the skill of sorting out the differences.

Social mobilization for peace was a process geared towards promoting reconciliation, confidence building between communities through collective and individual effort. It committed not only women but also traditional institutions, the youth etc.

The development of positive complimentary relations through actions of solidarity, mutual and humanitarian assistance.

### 3. The key of success of women actions

Due to the willingness of women to opt for peace traditional methods of conflict management have been utilized by women. They adopted attitudes of bringing sister, husbands favoring peace according to the present interlocutor while strictly guarding neutrality. But also they managed to mobilize all women in the North and others in the rest of the country in their struggle for peace.

This noble struggle of women ended by winning the traditional chiefs who are moral personalities cementing the society which enjoys great influence among the people. « Since the time we heard your various appeals, it became evident to us that peace shall soon be achieved » We confided to the notables whom we met during the sensitization session.

The pertinent initiatives and moral support of everybody (public, fighters, government).

The courage commitment and availability of women at any time during which the intervention of the civil society was difficult we were obliged to make a daring attempt

The neutrality truth and impartiality in dealing with all victims according to the means and availability:

The facility of mobilizing women and their availability at any time.

The search for financial autonomy in the management of crisis.

The willingness of MNFPUN its neutrality viz-a viz the fighters in the communities and some political parties were the best weapon in the search for peace.

The targeted groups are:

Governments women youth and civilian armed groups involved in the conflict.

It is against this background that since the establishment of the Movement the Malian women invested in the conflict experienced by their country therefore, various outlets of a solution led us to signing a pact on 11 th April 1991 as well as the demobilization and disarming of all armed groups up to the achievement of peace on 26 th March 1996 IN Tombouctou.

## **6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP**

1. Encourage women struggle in the management of conflict and peace building.
2. Facilitate women collaboration with political and administrative authorities as well as international partners in the struggle for peace. Fight for transparence in the distribution of aid accorded by humanitarian organizations of ensure that it reaches the targeted people in the areas of conflict.

- Fight against the proliferation of light arms and anti-personnel mines
- Mobilize the women to take initiatives and make much more personal sacrifices for peace.
- Intensify a wide culture of peace within the society family and schools
- Undertake sensitization actions aimed at the leadership of the armed groups youth women with a view to adopting a United Nations Conventions on prohibition or restriction on the use of certain classic weapons.

**LEARNING FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA: WORKSHOP ON THE  
EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MEDIATORS IN AFRICAN**

**CONFLICTS:**

**TO BE HELD AT ARUSHA TANZANIA,**

**21 st-23<sup>rd</sup> JANUARY, 1998**

**LESSONS OF PEACE KEEPING IN RWANDA**

**Presented by:**

**H.E. Ambassador Sharyar M: Khan**

**Former Special Representative of the Secretary General**

**Of the United Nations to Rwanda**

## **LESSONS OF PEACE KEEPING**

### **Could Genocide have been prevented?**

The critical questions in regard to Rwanda are could early warnings of genocide have been foreseen and if so, could the massacres have been prevented? With the benefit of hindsight, the answers to both these questions appear to be in the affirmative. So where did the world go wrong?

Against the backdrop of continuous ethnic strife, frequent violence and mounting political tension, it was evident after the breakdown of the Arusha Agreement, that Rwanda was heading for a civil war. The vital failure of the international community was that it did not make the distinction between a civil war and the more abhorrent syndrome of genocide. The fact that the civil war and the genocide took place at the same time blurred the distinction further. The basic diagnosis was faulty and the prescription that the Security Council provided was the traditional one for civil wars, as in Somalia, Mozambique or Liberia. There was a chapter VI mandate that called for a cease-fire, reconciliation and a return of the Arusha Accords when the imminence of genocide demanded a heavily armed, peace-ensuring, Chapter VII presence to prevent civilian massacres. After all, much later, the Security Council did approve a Chapter VII presence for Operation Turquoise but by then, nearly a million people had been massacred.

The fact that genocide took place is no longer in doubt. The International Commission of Expert, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Secretary General himself have recognized that genocide was committed in Rwanda. The crucial point is whether its planning was discernible. The RPF has consistently maintained that, between August 1993 and April 1994, it had repeatedly informed the SRSG, the Force Commander and important Ambassadors in Kigali that genocide was being planned. The RPF leadership stated that houses of Tutsis and Hutu moderates had been marked, personalities identified and armed militia trained to start executions at the appointed hours. I checked all correspondence sent by SRSG, Booh-Booh and by Force Commander Dallaire to Headquarters and found no reference whatsoever to the kind of messages that the RPA claimed they had conveyed to responsible officers of UNAMIR in UNAMIR reports and assessments, there is frequent mention of re-arming, of military confrontation, of high ethnic tension and of a descent towards civil war but no reference to a planned and systematic killing of the civilian population.

There can be several explanations for this gap. The first is that the RPA leadership did not convey, as emphatically as it now claims, the indication of mass killings of innocent civilians. Second, that senior UNAMIR officers and diplomats either considered the messages to be exaggerated expressions of fear or they deliberately played down the accusation against the government of the rimes, preferring to project a picture of an even-handed descent towards civil war but not of one-sided genocide. A third explanation is that the concept of genocide is so alien to human experience and so outrageous an image to contemplate, that its signs were simply not absorbed by Ambassadors, senior UN representatives, or members of the Security Council who continued to prescribe antidotes for a civil war.

The flow of information from UN Headquarters to the Security Council was insufficient in terms of depth and width. Unlike a diplomatic mission which installs several antennas to pick up and evaluate signals from the field a UN peace-keeping mission is not equipped with trained diplomats operating as a cohesive unit. Nor does it have intelligence gathering capacity that could help build up an accurate picture of events. Apart from briefing given periodically by UNHQ to the Security Council, member states represented on the Council rely on their

own sources of information from the field in Rwanda. As most missions had closed down during the genocide the flow of accurate information to the Security Council was almost exclusively dependent on media report. In short, an accurate picture of impending genocide in Rwanda was not assessed at UNHQ and by the Security Council mainly because political developments were not accurately evaluated from the field.

The United Nations was represented in Rwanda in three distinct phases. First, as a Watch-dog ensuing the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. Next, when Arusha broke down, as peace—keepers preventing violence and civil war, and third, when civil war actually broke out, as a force aiming to protect to protect the civilian population. In none to these phases was UNAMIR given the personnel equipment, logistics and budget to full fill the mandate prescribed for it by the Security Council. Nor was its mandate adequately geared to meet a fast changing situation. For example, in May 1994, UNAMIR was sanctioned a force of 5500 but, three months for all the promised equipment to reach Rwanda. In contrast, the single country operation under UN cover (operation Turquoise) was fully deployed in a matter of three days.

Two lessons flow from this experience. First, in a critical scenario, such as Rwanda, there is a need for the Security Council to have a wider and deeper information base available to them. Political assessments by military experts academics, media representatives operating in the field, NGOs and Agency representatives should be available to the Security Council. In addition, satellite information that could, for instance, pinpoint large movement of refugees or of people seeking refuge in Churches and stadia should also be available to the UN. Finally, un cadres who are in the field reporting back to Headquarters should be trained to assess political developments, like a well trained foreign service, so that the UN is able to project a cohesive, unified political assessment of developments. At present, the UN system does not have such a trained cadre and usually a UN political presence in a theater of operations, consists of individuals, albeit of distinguished diplomatic backgrounds, who are not part of a trained, unified cadre. Given their differing backgrounds and training, they o not mesh into a cohesive unit.

Had early warnings been available and had assessments from the field indicated possibility of genocide, pre-emptive action may have been possible with a UNAMIR mandate and force component that was appropriate to the crisis. Second, a standby trained peace-keeping force with appropriate equipment, logistics and budgetary back-up should be ready for assembly and rapid movement into a crisis zone. Obviously, the expenditure of keeping such a peace-keeping unit ready for emergencies is prohibitive. However, as the Secretary General proposed in relation to the crisis in Burundi, the unit need not be physically gathered in readiness for action but should have the capability of being quickly assembled.

### **PEACE-KEEPING - PEACE BUILDING**

Another glaring anomaly that needs to be addressed is the role of peace keeping in a post civil war situation. This twilight zone appears between the end of a civil war and the point when UN Specialised Agencies and donor governments are able to activate their emergency assistance programmes.

In Rwanda, UNAMIR had a fully equipped, disciplined force of 5500 peace -keepers already deployed throughout Rwanda to protect civilians at risk but agonizingly, but to help the people of Rwanda revive their shattered country. UNAMIR had engineers to repair the water and power connections, it had communications technicians to repair telephone and telegraph lines, it had the equipment to secure areas, it had carpenters, masons and electricians to revive destroyed houses and office buildings, it had vehicles to help sanitation and municipal services, it could repair roads and bridges, it could carry medicines, food and agricultural tools to help people start earning their live again, it had the engineering and construction capability to enlarge existing prisons and to convert godowns and bus depots into temporary detention centres, it could help build new barracks, it had graders and levelers that could prepare the ground for returning refugees.

With the best will in the world, these tasks could not have been carried out by any of the NGOs or UN specialized agencies for at least six months. And yet UNAMIR did not have the

mandate to perform this damage repair role. Even more frustrating and incongruous was UN HQ's direction that UNAMIR could not be given a peace-building role as this task was the exclusive domain of the humanitarian agencies. It was maintained that peace keeping was funded by assessed contribution could be used to fund on such projects.

While performing our primary function of peace-keeping, UNAMIR could have been given the additional task of post conflict peace-building by the Security Council adopting the following simple enabling clause in UNAMIR's peace keeping mandate:

« In order to encourage national reconciliation and the voluntary return of refugees, UNAMIR would assist, where possible, in the repair and rehabilitation of Rwanda's infrastructure in addition to its peace keeping responsibilities ».

Moreover, donor countries who were at the time spending US\$ 2 million a day in the refugee camps and US\$ 15 million a week in maintaining UNAMIR peace keepers in Rwanda, should have been persuaded to divert approximately US\$ 20 million towards UNSG's trust Fund for Rwanda which would have acted as the essential fuel for the peace-building effort in the twilight Zone.

### **RETURN OF REFUGEES AND RECONCILIATION**

Another lesson learnt refers to the refugees and efforts to induce their early, voluntary return. This was a critical element of the broader issue of national reconciliation. Without significant return of refugees, the process of national reconciliation would not take-off. I have already referred in the chapter related to coordination that political guidance to the humanitarian agencies may have resulted in a more even balance in providing humanitarian relief between refugees and the victims of genocide. The headlong, cascading of humanitarian aid compared to the relatively scant funding for the survivors of genocide was surely avoidable. The

humanitarian agencies were clearly reacting to gruesome television images and the mass of humanity which had flowed in Ngara, Bukavu and Goma more out of fear than actual persecution, shepherded across the borders by the very leadership militia and interahamwe that has spearheaded the genocide and who now took control of the camps and implemented their murderous intimidation of potential returnees. While it is understandable that in the heat of the crisis, the humanitarian agencies were obliged to respond to a disaster situation, appropriate of humanitarian assistance between the sympathizers of genocide and the aggrieved, but it would also have led to corrective measures against this aid being converted for military purposes.

The responsibility for allowing the camps, situated on the border to become hotbeds of guerrilla activity, of military training and arsenals for sabotage which eventually led to the appointment of an International Commission of Inquiry (ICI) must lie with the international community.

Moreover, there were clear signs that it was intimidation rather than the fear of maltreatment on return home that was the major hurdle preventing refugee return. These signs were apparent when nearly a million IDPs were settled smoothly and with reasonable security in their communes as a result of around 15000 refugees, it was clear that they were content to return home and were, in fact, settled with remarkable efficiency by the Rwanda government assisted by UNAMIR and the UN Agencies. Of course, the final proof that intimidation was at the core of refugee non-return came in the events of NOV/Dec 1996 when general skirmishes between the extremist militia, the interahamwe controlling the camps and the Tutsi settlers in South Kivu led to military defeat of the former, releasing hundreds of thousands of refugees to return home.

## **UN RADIO**

A final lesson is for the United Nations to explain and projects its presence in a particular theater of operations. Therefore, a UN radio conveying the objectives and policies of its

operations is essential. It was difficult to obtain clearance for Radio UNHCR but once achieved, it provide a vital element of UNAMIR's operations in Rwanda. Every peace keeping operation requires a radio as also a well trained, well equipped, adequately budgeted information officer who is capable of projecting UN's efforts in the country of operations. This officer should also act as spokesman for the SRSG. In my experience, UNICEF was way ahead of all UN agencies in projecting a positive image and I would gladly have utilised its well trained experts and staff as part of UNAMIR's effort at public relations and projecting a positive image for the whole UN family in Rwanda.

**WORKSHOP ON EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL  
MEDIATORS ON AFRICAN CONFLICTS**

**21-23 January 1998: ARUSHA - TANZANIA.**

**LESSONS LEARNED FROM EXPERIENCES IN CONFLICT  
RESOLUTION AND PEACE MAKING IN AFRICA-WITH SPECIAL  
REFERENCE TO SOMALIA**

**BY**

**FELIX G.N. MOSHA**

**Paper prepared on behalf of the African Dialogue Center for Prevention  
Management and resolution of Conflict in Africa -Arusha, Tanzania.**

## **CONTENTS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

### **B. PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION AND UNDESRTANDING OF POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL CONFLICT BY NATIONAL LEADERSHIP. The Background to the Collapse of the Somali State**

### **C. INTERVENTIONS AND THE ROLE OF SPECIFIC ACTORS**

**United Nations and the International Community as a whole**

**Regional States and their Organisations and Civil Society**

### **D. A SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK OF A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CONFLICT INVOLVING A MULTIPLICITY OF FACTIONS AND ACTORS.**

### **E. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OBSERVATIONS.**

## **A INTRODUCTION**

I. The complexity of the Somali conflict is such that experience or lessons as for gained cannot be explained fully in a few pages. The UN publication on the subject, "The United Nations and Somalia (1999 - 1995), released; the end of 1996 cover 516 pages of single space and in smallest letters. This should be enough to indicate that this paper, at best, can only merely highlight the major aspects of the Somali situation.

2. In addition to Somalia, this paper makes some observations pertaining to experiences gained in other conflict situations in Africa especially to the extend that the Somali experience is also relevant to such other countries. The key areas I have highlighted are: (a) the problem of recognition and/or understanding of potential or actual conflict situations by national leadership as a background to the evolution that led to the collapse of the Somali State; (b) external interventions and the role of specific actors]- particularly, the international community, through the UN, the regional -fates and their organizations, and, the Civil Society; (c) the multiplicity of Factions and External Actors and its effect on a settlement Framework; (d) the multidimensional characteristics and multiplicity of actors in and (e) some concluding Remarks or Observations.

3. Experience gained in conflict resolution in Africa is useful in a number of ways: many of the conflicts involved are in different stages of resolution and the cumulative lessons so far gathered (in the course of attempts to resolve such conflicts) would be useful in guiding a viable direction in remaining phases of the process. Even in those cases where Agreements were signed and implemented -Mozambique being the most successful and, Liberia the most recent, such countries are still in a phase of a building process whose success is always crucial to avoid a relapse to a chaotic order. But it is important to emphasize the limite in the application of such experiences across different conflict situations. The fact is that beside their commonalties of senseless destructions and brutal killings, no two conflict situations are exactly alike. In other words, to the extent that certain elements of experience gained in one conflict situation can always be useful in the resolution of another, the reality is that such

experiences cannot be applied lock -stick and barrel However, one area of conflict in which experience in one case is substantially relevant in others, is with respect to conflict prevention. This is particularly so - given the social economic context of many conflicts in Africa. As a result, the continent is replete with cases where the neglect of the experiences of others led to domestic conflict situations which could otherwise be prevented.

#### **B PROBLEMS OF RECOGNITION AND/OR UNDERSTANDING OF POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL CONFLICT BY NATIONAL LEADERSHIP**

4. A number of examples will illustrate the little recognition or understanding which some African leaders are prepared to accord to an existing or emerging conflict. At the height of civil wars in Africa, an initiative towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) - actually modeled on the European Security Conference (ESC) was launched jointly by OAU together with ECA and the African Leadership Forum. After it had been formulated by The Kampala Forum, it was tabled at two OAU Summits (Abuja 1991 and Dakar 1992). Ironically, the countries which spoke most strongly against the initiative (with the notable exemption of Mozambique which supported it ) happened to have been those in conflict and precisely the ones who had necessitated the initiative.

5. Subsequent to the CSSDCA initiative, the OAU launched its agenda on the establishment of the Conflict Mechanism. Some of the countries which opposed it all the way from the Dakar Summit to Cairo Summit that finally approved it, also happened to be in conflict. It was only after the establishment of the OAU Conflict Mechanism that those OAU member states experiencing civil strife in their respective countries could no longer strongly resist being put on OAU Communal Summit agenda. Even today, some of those in conflict are not willing to be put on the OAU agenda and those showing serious signs of instability would take great exception at a suggestion; that they be put on the OAU agenda. Quite recently, immediately after the civil war in Congo Brazzaville, the conflict in the country was tabled at a particular meeting and the countries representative took the floor and without any sign of irony, he

stated that there was no conflict in his country and that all it needed was a lot of humanitarian assistance then he proceeded to give the figures of external assistance needed.

6. The attitude of non-recognition of an existing or an emerging conflict by some African leaders at the continental level has been the same at the national level. So much so that serious domestic conflict in an African country is always initially reported by non-African media or sources. And very often it would be denied or played down until it becomes so wide spread that a denial becomes unreasonable. It is this process that had led to major conflict in some of the African states.

### **The Background to the Collapse of the Somali State.**

7. The collapse of the Somali State is traceable to lack of open recognition or at least understanding of the deep rooted nature of the conflict by its leadership that might have helped to reverse its direction towards disaster. Mohammed Siyad Barre had come to power in October 1969 at a time the Somalis were gearing away from clanism to nationalism and a concept of Greater Somalia. With a crafty use of Somalia's strategic location, he attracted massive military and economic assistance from the Cold War powers. In fairness, he carried out some very useful national development activities especially in socio-economic infrastructure- education, health, transport and communication, etc.

8. Of its population of roughly 10 million the Somalis are made up of some five major clans: Hawiye, Darodi Isaq Dir, and Digil-Mirifle. **As illustrated by Hussein M. Adam** in his article (Somali: A Terrible Beauty Been Born 1993 - Published by SAIS **African Studies Library and Edited by I. William Zartman** each of the Somali clans is sub-divided into six or more clans which in turn are sub-divided into subclans and sub-subclans stretching down to lineage's and extended families The most stable subunit is the lineage segment. In the Somali nomadic and other cultural concentrations, clan parochialism had historically guided group interest. As a result, their common language religion, physical characteristics, customs traditions, etc, had not united them as closely as would have otherwise been expected.

9. At a time Siyad Barre appeared to be forging a strong Somali unity, he made a tragic error of changing direction into three areas which always constitute the seeds of national destruction: (a) in an effort to consolidate personal power he blocked all avenues of non-violent dissent, instituted repressive measures and started carrying out executions by targeting those he considered his opponents, particularly from clans other than his own; (b) he then substituted clanism for ideology in favor of his own clan, the Marehem of the Darod clan - whom he placed in key positions. He carried this so far that it reportedly acquired a Code name M.O.D. M for his Marehem Sub-clan, O for Ogaden - his mother's sub-clan, and D for Dulbahante - that of his principal Son in Law who was also the Chief of National Security; (c) at the same time, corruption at all levels of the state fueled by massive Cold War funds became wide spread. With these developments, the process of instability in Somalia had begun.

10. The initial domestic failures of Siyad Barre were concealed by a semblance of unity that the Somalis maintained in preparation for an issue on which they were (almost all) united, the realization of Greater Somalia. In the process, he built up a formidable military machine. From an army that numbered 3,000 at independence in 1960, a total of 37,000 strong actually entered the Ogaden. By 1982, the Somali army had grown to an incredible level of 120,000 (Zartman in Collapsed States 1995). After the Ogaden disaster, the Somali Unity started evaporating under divide and rule tactics and elite manipulation of clans. Repression by the state increased, proliferation of clans, sub-clans and sub-sub clans led to clan based groupings with defecting military officers from the huge defeated army solidifying the clan armed factions. In the face of emerging instability, an old claim by the Isaq of disproportionate distributional benefits (dating all the way from the unification of the South and the British Somaliland), assumed an accession demand. As armed opposition to Siyad Barre by different claims grew, he singled out the North for particular devastation. This led to the increased bitterness that has driven it to declare accession in May 1992. After Isaacs SNM briefly overran Hargeisa, government aircraft and artillery destroyed the city, killing an estimated 50,000 people. Some 50,000 were driven from their homes and 370,000 fled to Ethiopia. It has even been suggested that Siyad Barre punished the North as severely as he did

as a way of uniting the South. In any event his actions in the North as elsewhere, demonstrated that there was still not a recognition by Siyad Barre of the seriousness of the conflict or an understanding that there was no military solution to the conflict. But more importantly, Africa or the rest of the world was yet to raise a finger against the atrocities of Siyad Barre.

11. In the end, Siyad Barre was faced with a solid armed opposition - albeit, largely clan based. The Majerteen of the Darod clan had organized their Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) since 1978 although were at intervals used by Siyad Barre against the Isaqs. The latter had established their Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981. The Hawiyes founded their United Somali Congress in 1989. In the same year, the Ogaden established their Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). The Rahanwiin of the Digil-Mirifle on their part formed the Somali (being cousins), Democratic Movement. In effect, every clan, subclan or sub subclan started seeing virtue in forming a movement as a way of defending group interests and benefits. It is this proliferation that led to the participation of 15 Somali factions at the meeting the UN had organized in Addis Ababa in January and March 1993. In the meantime, the number of factions has increased substantially. The Sodere Agreement for example (that was brokered with the help of Ethiopia in the Ethiopian Town of Sodere) was signed by 26 Somali factions. The Aidid group was not a signatory of the Sodere Agreement - claiming, among other things that the 26 factions did not exist since it (the Aidid group) was still made up of 15 factions out of the original group of 16 factions which the UN had put together in Addis Ababa.

12. All along external aid had served as a glue that held the Somali clans together. Siyad Barre had succeeded in using the massive aid funds to maintain a precarious peace between his different clans. In 1998, in response to its congressional criticism of Siyad Barre's human rights violations, and also a realization that the end was rapidly winding up on his regime, U.S. suspended its military assistance to Somalia. Succession of economic aid followed in 1989. As would be expected, other countries and international organizations followed suit.

13. In the end as economic and security conditions worsened Siyad Barre's ability to play one clan against the other was over. A determined armed opposition with which he was not prepared to seriously negotiate was getting stronger. As his options narrowed, he resorted to a more brutal system of governance irrespective of the human cost. As late as 1989, he jailed and harassed members of a nonviolent group called "The Manifest" which was trying to find a peaceful way-out. Even after the armed opposition had closed on him in Mogadishu, and forced him to flee in January 1991 he continued to fight back through 1992 on the trope that he might still make it. What he left behind was a collapsed state with no internationally recognized government; no authority to carry out national administration; no public service or public security services no police; no formal legal system; no telephone and postal services; no electricity or piped water systems; no banking and insurance services; no educational or reliable health services. It was a classic case of a total state collapse. The civil war had uprooted 1.7 million people or one fifth of the population. Some 700,000 fled to Kenya and 250,000 internally displaced persons camped in Mogadishu. Its civil war and famine had claimed 300,000 lives by the time the U.S. led force moved in December 1992 to facilitate humanitarian relief. Only 15 of the 70 hospitals and clinics were functioning and payment to the soldiers was in a form of the share of the loot they captured from the "enemy".

14. A substantial amount of space has been devoted to the details on the background to the collapse of the Somali State because as will be noted subsequently, the collapse and its causes became a major part in the complexity of the conflict. In addition, this background it is also intended to demonstrate that the evolution in Somalia simply represents the worst case situation. Otherwise, the most common threads and characteristics of conflict - affected African countries or situations - as Somalia so abundantly demonstrated has been the attitude and the background policies of its respective leadership. For example, in the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia, the background was much the same: nepotism; repression; and corruption. And when the armed conflict erupted the leadership in each country could not recognize or understand the magnitude of the problem. As late as December 1994 (more than a year) after Foday Sankoh had started his armed opposition in Sierra Leone, one could not get the leaders in Free Town to agree on whether or not Foday Sankoh really existed

### **C. INTERVENTIONS AND THE ROLE OF SPECIFIC ACTORS.**

15. The issue of external intervention in domestic conflicts situations in an African country remains controversial and has many dimensions. First is whether or not there should be an intervention; second is the form the intervention should take; and, third is the question of who should intervene. The establishment of the OAU Conflict Mechanism has greatly helped to facilitate discussions by Africa on such issues, but has yet to provide appropriate positions to each of these dimensions and in every conflict situation

#### **Intervention in Somalia by the United Nations and the international Community as a whole.**

16. Somalia was a country that cried for external intervention while representing a case that provided no model for anyone to follow. There are basically four forms of external intervention in a domestic conflict situation in an African country. Quiet diplomacy, sanctions, and military intervention intervention in Somalia, any from could not be carried out on the basis of a request or with the consent of a host government - since there was no government. An agreement among the parties to the conflict was not possible either.

17. The Somali conflict involves a larger concentration of clans. However, its central structure came to assume an infra Hawiye conflict because it engulfed the capital city and key institutions (within a geographical space known as the Benadir Region) and strategically necessitated a resolution in order to address the wider conflict. The founding of the United Somali Congress (USC) had left it with two wings - one internal led by a Manifesto Group member Ali Mahdi Mohammed from the Abgal sub clan of the Hawiye, and the other, external led by USC's military wing leader General Mohammed Farah Aidid from the Habr Gedir sub clan of the Hawiye. He had organized a congress near the Ethiopian - Somali border **that had** elected him Chairman of USC. But this election had not been recognized by the Mogadishu-based internal wing under Ali Mahdi. At any rate, when Siyad Barre fled Aidid (who was still fighting his way to Mogadishu) refused to recognize the government take over by Ali Mahdi.

The deadly fighting that ensued, initially claiming some 25,000 lives - within the first four months, led to series of events which have remained a major **obstacle to a negotiated settlement in Somalia**. Not only that the Hawiye infra clan fighting culminated in Aidid forming his own government, but also, marked a national opening where different clan factions took control of their different geographical areas and those clans without factions were compelled to form one as a way of protecting clan interests. These structures continue to exist to date.

18. The Security Council adopted its first resolution 733 (1992) on Somalia on 23 January 1992. Consequently, the UN started off with a mediation effort in January 1992 aimed at reconciling Aidid and Mahdi to pave the way for a more comprehensive settlement involving the whole country. The two agreed on a ceasefire in March 1992 and subsequently agreed on its monitoring mechanism. While Mahdi favored a UN peacekeeping force to monitor the cease fire, Aidid was against. In the meantime, the humanitarian crisis was worsening. Of the 4.5 million Somalis who required humanitarian support, 1.5 million were considered to have been at risk of dying.

19. Intervention in Somalia finally took place under the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) numbering some 37,000 troops with the U.S. providing 28,000 marines and infantry and 9,000 soldiers from more than 20 countries. It constituted a unique international effort. The UNITAF operation that evolved into UNISOM II assumed an unprecedented mandate of restoring a failing state. It was the most challenging undertaking by the UN in its 50 year history. All these were disrupted with an unequally unprecedented confrontation between the UN and a faction to the conflict -leading to unacceptable levels of casualties on 12 July 1993. This marked the beginning of the of international interest in Somalia and when subsequently no breakthrough on a peaceful settlement could be reached between the parties, UNISOM II withdrew from Somalia in March 1995.

20. In winding up UNISOM, the Security Council approved the establishment of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) as a clear signal that it was not abandoning

Somalia. The mandate of UNPOS as approved by the Security Council is to continue assisting the process of national reconciliation in Somalia; to monitor and assess political developments in Somalia; to serve as a link between the Somali leaders and the UN; and, to provide regular briefing to the Security Council on Somalia. In addition, all relevant Agencies of the UN - in cooperation with external and internal NGO's have continued to render humanitarian assistance to Somalis throughout the country. Due to problems of security in Mogadishu, many of the current UN operations for Somalia - including UNPOS, have temporarily located in Nairobi.

The Regional States and their Organizations.

22 It is true that the OAU - obviously acting on behalf of its members was the one that requested Security Council action on Somalia in December 1991 which subsequently led to the UN effort. It is also correct that many African countries including. Nigeria, Egypt, Zimbabwe, etc. made substantial contribution of troops to UNSOM operations. However, much of the effort. was in a context of an overall international - rather than a regional effort. In the early stages, one exception - in terms of an African effort was the mediation attempt d by Egypt, Djibouti and Ethiopia But following UNISOM withdraw, neighbouring countries and the OAU basically took over the process of national reconciliation in Somalia.

### **The Civil Society.**

23. Much of the humanitarian effort in Somalia prior to, and after UNISOM was carried out by civil society institutions in the form of external and domestic NGOs. Apart from their active involvement in humanitarian activities especially, food, health care and education, the NGOs were instrumental in getting the international community to pay attention to the Somali conflict. At that time, the UN with the key major powers were heavily involved in former Yugoslavia. This had led former Secretary-General Boutros Ghali to make a remark to the effect that the "UN was only fighting a rich man's war". After UNISOM, a Somali Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) was established and continue to bring together many of the actors

on Somalia. Over three quarters of the membership of SACB are external and local Somali NGOs

## **D.A SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK OF A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONFLICT AND THE MULTIPLICITY OF FACTIONS AND ACTORS**

### **A settlement Framework**

24. A settlement framework for the Somali conflict attempted to achieve a cease fire; so that they would be a process of what was agreed as voluntary disarmament and demobilization; to be followed by a then a set up of a negotiated national government; and, agreement on timing for national elections. These have remained a basic strategy by all those who have been trying to bring about a settlement in Somalia The UN for its part went about by successfully bringing 15 factions together They met under the UN sponsorship in Addis Ababa in January 1993, and subsequently in March the same year and a year later in Nairobi in March 1994 In all these conferences the Somali fractions had reached good agreements to lead Then all the way establishme government. But the implementation of the Agreements were not adherent to bay the Somali factions

25. Simultaneously, the UN tried a bottom up approach in Somalia that was felt would eventually sustain a settlement process. It embarked on setting up forty district Councils in Somalia's seventy seven district. The continuation of this effort was interrupted by UNISOMs with draw. But besides the nation building effect that was inherent in the establishment of the Councils, there is no evidence that the process was going to be decisive in bringing about a rapid movement towards national reconciliation.

26. As for the regional effort, it was ironically after the Somali's had failed to achieve a lasting national reconciliation under UNISOM that the effort of the regional stases and that of the OAU became more pronounced. In particular, the mandate the OAU gave to Ethiopia to lead the reconciliation process in Somalia under the framework for the Inter-governmental

Authority for Development (IGAD). As a result Ethiopia has made a strenuous effort to achieve peace in Somalia. One of its major successes was the SODERE Agreement which 26 Somali Factions signed in Jan January 1997 and subsequently followed up by SODERE II. A major achievement of the SODERE process was that it reduced and held together the many faction players into two blocks for the South and three adding North West Somaliland. These SODERE Group; the Aidid Group; and, the Ibrahim Egal side Secondly, in addition to formulating various instruments of state organs, SODORE set a process leading to a National Reconciliation Conference in Bosaso capital of North West) where a constitution, a parliament and a government are to agreed upon and elections to follow after an agreed period of time However, the A did Group which had declined an invitation to attend the SODERE meeting, rejected the Agreement by questioning the legitimacy of the Factions and claiming of Ethiopian aggression against Somalia. Ibrahim Egal also rejected SODERE on the "rounds that his part of Somalia is an independent country

**27. But between the withdraw of UNISOM and the more active effort of the** neighbouring countries, the Aidid wing - and his self declared government, had split. his key financial backer Ossman Atto - **significantly from the Habr Gidir subclan** took control of his own area in Mogadishu and effectively became an independent player in any negotiation process. A more complicated layer was added to the process because the reconciliation within the Habr Gidir (Atto and Aidid side)

became difficult arising from claims that Atto was responsible for the ambush that led to Gen Aidid's death. Against this back drop, and prior to the SODERE Agreement Kenya had addressed the Benadir situation by bringing together all the three players: Ali Mahdi; Hussein Aidid(Gen.Aidid's son and his successor); and, Osman Atto. The three signed a Nairobi Statement which they failed to implement. Egypt for its part has organized two major reconciliation sessions in Cairo principally dealing with the Benadir region players, the latest of which reached an Agreement in December 1997 under which Aidid will reportedly participate at a National Reconciliation Conference, but the venue earmarked by SODERE will change.

## **A Multidimensional Nature of the Somali Conflict.**

28 The intractability of the Somali conflict - like many other conflicts, lies in its multidimensional roots. The major problem was one of a collapse state with all the attendant humanitarian complexities which taken together created conditions for which the international community lacks the appropriate instruments for a resolution. A major obstacle issue has also been the socio-economic context of a settlement. The Somali economy collapsed before the state had collapsed. In the process of economic collapse, and the preceding Ogaden and the civil war, economic interests of various clans were undermined and many lost their properties. A settlement must address therefore localized some conditions which are difficult to factor into a comprehensive process. Secondly, Somalis' clanism that deepened under Siyad Barre (there are altogether some 50 clans) brought about a fragmentation of society and factions which could not see beyond clan territory and interests. The factions constantly face the danger that they will lose the support of their respective clans if their focus becomes national rather than clan based.

## **The Multiplicity of Factions and Actors**

29. Perhaps the greatest problem in a settlement in Somalia has been the multiplicity of actors - both internal and external. Internally, besides the mistrust rooted in old clan conflicts, the factions lacked the ideological or political foundation to forge a national settlement. The implications have been that all sorts of political tendencies have pulled the process to different directions: there are those who favor a unitary state; others a Federation; and some a Confederation.

Secondly, under the destruction Siyad Barre had carried out, civil society and organized opposition was dissipated denying the country the conditions and institutions to create a successor state. The ideological divide is even wider: some have been calling for a Theocratic state; others for some kind of Consociational democracy that would recognize ethnic, clan and religious interests in constituting government, parliament and other organs of state.

30. To compound the multiplicity of internal actors has been the multiplicity of -external actors. Some of these actors may not have been sufficiently familiar with the multidimensional character of the Somali conflict. The complications of external actors goes all the way back to UNISOM days and to the present on-going effort. Under such conditions, it has been possible for individual factions to play one external actor against another. Lately, some effort at coordination has been initiated by the UN. However, it will take more than the current UN attempt to bring about a concerted and coordinated approach by those trying to bring about a settlement in Somalia

31. The background to the collapse of the Somali state and other experiences have come to demonstrate that the seeds of domestic conflict i.e. nepotism, repression and corruption are usually planted many years before a conflict erupts.

A number of factors have shaped - in many cases negatively, the attitude of leadership in conflict countries towards their domestic conflicts. These include: (a) the failure of the leadership and with it, the national institutional infrastructure; and, (b) taking refuge in the notion of non-interference in the internal affairs of others. which African states have carried to the extreme.

## **SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OBSERVATIONS.**

2. The nature of the original intervention in Somalia had assumed such an International character that it was viewed as ushering in a positive form of International multi-literalism that could have been further to successfully address the problems of small states - especially those in conflicts. The opposite turned out to be the case. In effect, the exercise itself was so unsuccessful that it ended up being the reason other deserving situations were not helped. Notwithstanding, the international community through the UN achieved a number of important measures in Somalia even if (UNISOM did not achieve its full mandate. It was able to bring the famine to an end; it restored vital socio-economic infrastructure it trained many Somalis who were expected would take over the running of their state; and, above. all it helped

to create an environment in which Somalis could and continue to address problems of their national reconciliation.

33. A number of lessons become evident from the Somali experience. To start with, Africa erred in maintaining the silence it did until Somalia collapsed. Secondly Africa should have moved early enough to play a leading role in the international effort instead of being a mere participant. Many external actors also played a negative role. They could not have been in any doubt that the building of the Somali army from 3,000 at independence to 120,000 in 1982 were out of all proportion with the legitimate defense needs of Somalia. It is particularly disquieting that the build up of the security apparatus of Siyad Barre proceeded under conditions of serious human rights violations. However, the finger need not be pointed at the external actors. The fact is that it was a failure of an African leadership.

34. It is often argued that Somalia reached the melt-down situation because Africa did not act early enough. Its no need blaming the rest of the world since Africa should have assumed the responsibility of raising concerns against the atrocities Siyad Barre was committing. At the very least, when he bombed and leveled Hargeisa, Africa should have raised an alarm. At the same time, it is also recognized that the situation in Somalia reached that level of deterioration because, unlike Liberia, where West Africa had a large country - Nigeria to lead a military intervention, East Africa lacked such a capacity.

35. It is also evident that multiplicity of actors - both internal and external can make a settlement difficult. Multiplicity of actors makes consensus and movement in negotiations difficult. This is particularly so when the internal bodies lack an ideological foundation or political sophistication and collective national commitment that can facilitate a settlement. It becomes all the more difficult when the credibility of many of the parties to the conflict is in down and some exercise a tenuous control of its military and much less political supporters.

36. Above everything else, at least a number of things stand out of the Somali experience along with others in Africa: (a) the theory of conflict in Africa as being tribal collapsed in Somalia.

The Somalia are basically made up of one tribe one language, one religion, one culture etc. (b) active involvement of regional countries particularly neighbours and relevant organisation i.e vital to achieving a settlement judging, not only from the achievement of the ECOWAS, but also from the progress Somali neighbours and IGAD have made towards national reconciliation in Somalia (c) a failure of a settlement to a conflict must always be attributed to the parties involved in the conflict considering that the Somalis had blamed others they never succeeded in achieving a settlement by themselves; (d) those who reject a negotiated settlement in pursuit of military victory end-up destroying themselves; and, (e) in the final analysis, a negotiated settlement of a conflict is only possible if the parties to the conflict favor a peaceful solution.

**LEARNING FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA**

Workshop on the Experience of Individual and institutional mediators in African conflicts

Organized by

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation of the United Republic of  
Tanzania

and

The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation with support from UNDP

Arusha, Tanzania, 21-23 January 1998

## BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

### Introduction:

Peace is an indispensable condition for the development of any society. Today, in many areas around the globe communities are yearning for peace, security and stability for their survival. By far the most pressing cases, at this point of human History, are located in Africa.

Resolution of infra-country and inter-country conflicts in Africa constitute the priority African nations must successfully address to create the enabling environment and conditions for development. It is a continental imperative as the links between African nations are such that the instability of one or more nations must affect the stability of other countries. Indeed, conflicts have been the most important factors in undermining the environment conducive to sustained economic development in Africa.

The causes of such conflicts are as varied as their levers of intensity. They range from lack of democratic institutions and social injustices (poverty) to ethnic and religious conflicts. Whatever the cause, they all have the same characteristics in common: the destruction of life and property, the deterrence to development and dismal prospects for people to build sustainable livelihoods. While some of the conflicts are winding down, others are raging on, and new ones are emerging. Perceptions may differ **on the** causes of these conflicts or their complexities and solutions but there is a consensus that conflicts in Africa, whatever their scope and nature, are increasingly constraining development and aiding Africa's global marginalisation. Thus, the efforts to agree on effective strategies and viable mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflicts need to be intensified. Ongoing efforts by such organizations like the UN, OAU, other InterGovernmental and Organizations (NGOs) and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) point to the need for concerted and effective efforts in search for peace

and prosperity in the region. Within this context, more institutional efforts should be devoted to conflict prevention through better understanding of root causes of conflicts, their timely prediction and attainment of peaceful resolutions.

To enhance the pursuit of improved strategies and mechanisms for conflict resolution and peace-building, the Tanzania Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, assisted by the United Nations Development programmer (UNDP), are organizing a regional workshop on Conflict-Prevention, -Resolution and -Management in Eastern, **Central and Southern** Africa. The workshop will focus on devising programmes and activities to contribute towards defusing emerging conflicts and resolving existing conflicts as a sine qua non for sustainable development in the region. The workshop will be attended by prominent African leaders, politicians, government officials, representatives of regional organisations, academia, IGOs and NGOs.

#### Workshop Objectives:

The workshop will review previous and current conflict resolution efforts, the efficacy of existing institutional arrangements for coping with inter-country conflicts, efforts and mechanisms for peace-building and reconciliation at the local level, and long-term strategies to remove the root-causes for conflicts in the region.

Specifically, the workshop will pursue the following objectives:

Provide a platform for experienced individual and institutional mediators in African conflicts to reflect on their experiences and to present lessons learned from their efforts;

Distill and synthesize from these direct accounts common denominators that need to be reviewed in the light of existing conflict resolution and management mechanisms in Africa;

Reflect on the unique dimensions of African efforts at conflict resolution and peace-making, specifically the collaboration between the United Nations and regional organisations, such as ECOWAS, IGAD and the OAU, and distill lessons from these experiences;

Articulate the role of African women in conflict-resolution, negotiations and the promotion of peace;

Review the potential of other international organisations, NGOs, the private sector, and community organisations, to contribute to conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation.

### **Workshop organisation and Scope:**

The workshop will span a three day period and will bring together Leaders of Government, high-level Government representatives, community leaders, mediators, and representatives from various organisations.

The Workshop is jointly organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tanzania and the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation. Funding has been provided by UNDP and UNIFEM.

### **Participation:**

About 50 participants are invited, including representatives from the following institutions and countries:

Institutions:

- 1.African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, ACCORD,
- 2.Centre for Foreign Relations, Tanzania
- 3.Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries, CPLP,
- 4.Commonwealth Secretariat,

5. Secretariat, East African Community, EAC,
6. Eastern and Southern African University Research Programme, ESAURP
7. Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS,
8. Ford Foundation,
9. Global Coalition for Africa
10. Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development, IGAD,
11. Organisation of African Unity, OAU,
12. Rockefeller Foundation
13. Southern African Development Community, SADC
14. United Nations Secretariat
15. U N D P
16. U N E C A
17. U N H C R
18. U N I C E F
19. U N I F E M
20. University of Dar es Salaam
21. Centre for Conflict Resolution - South Africa
22. U N O P S

Participating Countries:

Algeria

Belgium

Burundi

China

Denmark

Egypt

Ethiopia

Finland

Germany

Italy

Lesotho

Malawi

Namibia

Nigeria

Portugal

Rwanda

South Africa

Sudan

Sweden

Tanzania

United Kingdom

Zambia

Japan

Angola

Botswana

Canada

Democratic Republic of Congo

Djibouti

Eritrea

European Union

France

Ireland

Kenya

Luxembourg

Mozambique

Netherlands

Norway

Russia

Somalia

Spain

Swaziland

Switzerland

Uganda

United States of America

Zimbabwe

Libya

Venues: The Arusha International Conference Centre

Dates:21-23 January 1998

Duration: 3 working days

Keynote Speaker: Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, Former President, United Republic of  
Tanzania

Closing Address: H.E. President Benjamin W. Mkapa, United Republic of Tanzania.

« RULES OF THE GAME IN RESOLVING DEEP ROOTED CONFLICTS: THE CASE  
OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS FOR RWANDA »

**Ambassador R. Mpungwe Chairperson and  
Co-ordinator of the Arusha Peace Negotiation for Rwanda  
10 July 1992 to 4th August 1993**

Chairperson,  
Honorable Ministers,  
Distinguished representative of the OAU Secretary General,  
Distinguished Delegates,  
Ladies and Gentlemen.

I continue to be deeply honored for the trust and confidence invested in me by my nation, to be the Chairperson and coordinator of the Arusha Peace Negotiations for Rwanda, which culminated in an agreement on August 4, 1993

I have been most thankful to our then President, His Excellency MR Ali Hassan Mwinyi who was the facilitator of those negotiations for according me the opportunity to co-ordinate and chair those negotiations on his behalf, - as his Special Representative. His counsel and guidance during the whole process was invaluable to my small team of hard working and dedicated staff and I, in seeing the process through.

It is in this context that I received and accepted this invitation with great honor and relation. I should, therefore, like to thank; both the joint-organisers and sponsors of this seminar for making it possible for me to be here to-day.

I shall, with great humility endeavor to share with you my personal thoughts and practical experience in dealing with conflict resolution, in the context of the Arusha Peace Negotiations for Rwanda as well as draw my wider and longer term experience in working closely for the

resolutions of the political conflicts which had characterised the Southern African region for many years, in the recent past.

While the Southern African region is now, predominantly at peace with itself, having become the most stable and highly democratised region in Africa, singularly focused on matters of socio-economic transformation and Africa's renaissance or renewal, issues of peace and stability have remained as evasive as ever, in the Great Lakes Region, that includes Rwanda and Burundi.

The conflicts that have continuously haunted Rwanda and Burundi, over the years, are much deeper and their implications much more profound, than the geographical sizes of those countries may suggest. There are still significant sections of those societies, people who continue to see danger in peace and locate security in war. And this is in spite of concerted efforts by the countries of the region and Africa as a whole to assist and facilitate peace processes in that region.

This goes to suggest that, the nature and character of the conflict situation in the Great Lakes Region assume the same proportions and is essentially as deep rooted as apartheid conflict was, or similar to the Palestinian, Northern Ireland and Bosnian conflict situations.

It means, therefore, that the regional neighbours, Africa and the international community as a whole, has to assume a higher responsibility and become more actively engaged than they have ever been before. Such a need, challenges any entity or individual who attempts to locate sustainable peace and stability in the region to invoke new thinking and evolve a different conflict resolution model and strategy, than usually applied, in other types of conflicts, including low intensity conflicts.

Such a preoccupation is what underpinned the Arusha Peace Process for Rwanda whose basic features would be further elaborated later as we endeavour to locate the fundamental rules of the game that govern the resolution of those conflicts.

### **Nature and Characteristic of deep rooted conflicts**

Deep rooted conflicts, by their very nature and character, are quite tenacious This is, precisely because they generally tend to revolve around the issues of basic human rights and needs, which include land, safety, security, identity self-esteem recognition and human development, as a whole.

rights and needs as well as conditions for themselves, and the children of 'their children.

### **Need for cutting edge diplomacy for deep rooted conflicts**

The resolution model and strategies for managing and resolving deep rooted conflicts are, therefore, significantly different from those that are meant for low intensity conflicts. While summitry approaches and dispatch of envoys and special representatives as well as international institutional framework and legal regimes may provide early and good basis for sustainable solutions the nature and character of deep rooted conflicts require resolution models and strategies that are far beyond the general thrust of traditional diplomacy.

Both Africa's and global experience have amply demonstrated that the application of traditional diplomacy as in the processes that led to the Lancaster House Agreement for Zimbabwe and the UN Security Council Resolution 435 for Namibia has been quite adequate and capable of producing sustainable solutions-to low intensity conflicts. However, the application of traditional diplomacy has proven to be far from being adequate, in providing meaningful and sustainable resolutions to deep rooted conflicts.

At the same time, low intensity conflicts could still be effectively resolved through traditional diplomacy even as the belligerents continue to hate: each other: dragged to the negotiating table while yelling and each other and may continue to go at each others throats even as they sing and implement peace agreements, like in the case of Zimbabwe Namibia and Liberia or even beyond the resolution phase like in the case of Angola

In the case of deep rooted conflicts, such developments would only work to anchor prospects for their resolution, on the opposite side of human endeavour.

Deep rooted conflicts, require alternative or cutting edge diplomacy that initially seeks to establish and strengthen regular and credible lines. of communications with and between the' principal belligerents and all stake holders, for purposes of building sufficient trust and confidence that it is possible to have negotiated solutions on win-win-basis. It requires a lot of confidence building, through trusted and darkroom diplomatic offensive, to convince the belligerents that underscores the fact that, it is possible to have negotiated solutions based on direct negotiations. On the basis of such contacts, and confidence building measures which should be sustainable such a diplomacy should be able to generate a comprehensive framework for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, that is capable of identifying appropriate structures and entry points, through natural maturity or induction, and spellout choice and role of mediators and/or facilitators as well as that of regional neighbours and the international community as a whole. Unlike low key conflicts, trust and confidence building measure are quite critical in any endeavour to resolve deep rooted conflicts - trust and foremost between the belligerents and all stake holders as well as they interact with the mediators and/or facilitators regional neighbours and the Intemational community at large.

### **Need for adequate preparations**

The type of diplomatic initiative that is proposed here, should also be able to outline a clear road map for the peace process encompassing both the vision and the mission of the process as well as effective strategies and easily identifiable sign posts, in a manner that increasingly builds momentum and confidence in the belligerents' dispositions and movement towards peaceful solutions. While political leadership is absolutely essential for purposes of driving and sustaining the peace process, a large measure of professional and technical inputs is also critical in the endeavour to effectively manage all the intricacies that are found in such conflicts.

Since, the attainment of sufficient trust and confidence which has sufficient room to expand and grow remains critical, to any endeavors to resolve deep rooted conflicts, direct negotiations should, therefore, become a permanent feature of such a process, once the belligerents are genuinely convinced that there is no alternative to a negotiated table. Proximity talks are only necessary at the formative stages of the process as well as at times when mediators or facilitators need to establish sufficient ground **for resolving areas of** material difference which also tend to be numerous. However, extended existence of proximity talks, would clearly indicate that prospects for an early solution, are still far and evasive.

Argued in the manner I have done above and as I shall further elaborate later, based on the experiences of the Arusha Peace Process for Rwanda, as well as the conflict situation on that had existed in the Southern African Region, it is quite clear that many of the aspects of traditional diplomacy, largely centred around summitry approaches as well as OAU or UN resolutions and declarations are quite inadequate in dealing with deep rooted conflicts. Many aspects of traditional diplomacy tend to focus more on legalities as well as moral and political appeals, which run the danger of generating irreconcilable public stances, among the belligerents, rather than enhancing the finer details of confidence building, measures, that need to be pursued and are critical in deep rooted conflicts

### **Qualities and role of mediators and/or facilitators**

Since deep rooted conflicts, even at their normal levels of intensity assume a pathological character of mutual destruction, on many occasions there seems to be no higher ethic acting as an overriding umbrella to the belligerents. At that level of conflict, on any objective elements tend to disappear and moral as well as political appeals to the belligerents to see sense become useless. The level of consciousness of the belligerents themselves about what is happening is usually reduced to a very low level. Ensuing that the other side loses, is for more important than their side winning. There seem to be less and less acknowledgment of normally considered acceptable standards of behaviour and destructive aims tend to predominate, with the view to achieving a zero-sum game outcome.

In the manner that such deep rooted conflicts escalate positions become more polarised. There is less movement between the parties, and eventually they are simply reduced to mere shadows of their-former selves. In the process, there is enormous loss of life, pain, suffering and destruction, largely on the part of ordinary citizens, women and children being the most vulnerable.

Cutting edge diplomatic initiatives should, therefore aim at establishing bench marks for the quality and role- of-mediators and/or facilitators that is consistent with the above described characteristics of deep rooted conflict Just as the stages of escalation, appear to descend into the depths, to a kind of 'hell' so the qualities required by the. third party become in contrast", more "heavenly".

Certainly greater moral and political qualities have to be developed and proven by the mediator and/or facilitator himself or herself extending beyond mere techniques and recipes which are abundant in text books.

If mediators and/or facilitators are to cope with their respective responsibilities and, in some cases in the power role as well, they should at least cultivate the ability to remain to be seen to be impartial, which is almost an impossible task in deep rooted conflicts, due to the high level of suspicion and mistrust among the belligerents The mediator and/or facilitator also need to have-the knowledge of team building, required of the process consultant, and it would be most valuable to develop some of the healing qualities of a social therapist! In summary it is an unenviable task and responsibility.

Multiplicity of initiatives and mediators and/or facilitators spells danger to the process which, of essence needs to be centralised and ensure proper management as well as adherence to the agreements and commitments that are freely and willingly reached. Chances for success are much higher if the mediator possesses or is backed up by, sufficient moral or political power or both, that could positively change and influence the respective positions of the belligerents in the course of negotiations - direct or proximity In that regard. nation-states and high

profiled political and moral personalities have better chances for success in resolving deep rooted conflicts than the international institutional framework technocratic personalities.

## **RULE OF GAME**

It is clear that the above observations also set out broad parameters for evolving rules of the game that would govern any endeavour to deal with deep rooted conflicts, in our continent, based on the experiences gained from the Arusha Peace Process for Rwanda as well as that from the Southern African conflicts. I would therefore enumerate those rules as follows:

### **RULE NO 1**

#### **NATURE AND CHARACTER OF THE CONFLICT NEED TO BE PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD PRIOR TO ANY ENDEAVOUR TO RESOLVE SUCH A CONFLICT.**

An endeavour to resolve any deep rooted conflict, needs to commence with acquisition of deeper insights about its dynamics in both, historical and prevailing perspectives. This has important implications for any meaningful resolution of such a conflict. 'As a matter of fact, it underscores the importance of true resolutions, rather than mere restraint of one of the belligerents or both.

In other words awareness of the character and dynamics of a deep rooted conflict provides reasons for optimism regarding its resolution.

It assists in determining the type of intervention model or diplomacy that needs to be applied as well as the supporting structures and strategies that need to be put in place. There are many examples whereby, great endeavors towards resolution of different deep rooted conflicts go to waste or fail, simply because the nature and character of such conflicts were not appropriately and objectively understood, leading to application of wrong resolution models.

The fulfillment of this fundamental requirement became my starting point when I took over the responsibility for the Rwandese conflict in February 1992.

The period from February to June 1992 was particularly dedicated to the establishment of a substantial knowledge base on the conflict as well as creation lines of communication with all the stakeholders within Rwanda, in the region and external powers which either had interest or influence over the events inside Rwanda. Awareness and clear understanding of that reality on the ground helped - us tremendously in determining an appropriate resolution model, framework structures, strategies and style.

## **RULE NO.2**

### **FORMULATE AND APPLY APPROPRIATE CONFLICT RESOLUTION MODEL OR DIPLOMACY**

In terms of conflict resolution model or diplomacy that arises from the above consideration, my team and I had to make a profound and dramatic paradigm shift from the perceptions and the resolution model that had been put in place between October 1990 when the conflict had graduated into pathological phase and the end of 1991, when those particular regional initiatives came to a dead end.

We realised that the traditional diplomacy that had broadly defined the character and strategy of intervention by the regional neighbours through summitry approaches that took place in Mwanza, Goma, Gbadolité, Zanzibar and Dodoma, was virtually incapable of creating stable, lasting or meaningful solutions.

The new model that we put in place, largely focused on establishing reliable and sustainable contacts and communications with all the parties to the conflict, regional neighbours and foreign powers who had either vested interests or influence over Rwanda and its neighborhood. Each party's positive or negative disposition was closely monitored and

evaluated, and some of areas of non material difference were eliminated early enough, through quiet diplomatic and political contacts, even before the commencement of the formal negotiations. In order to deal with the problems of initial credibility gap and mistrust, as respective parties to the conflict refused to allow each other to gain insights into their real motives or objectives, personal relationships had to be established and understanding reached on key start-up issues in a manner that built momentum and confidence, on the positive objectives of the entire initiative.

At the top of the process, President Mobutu's role as the official Mediator was counter balanced by President Mwinzi's role as the Facilitator of the process, and elaborate strategy was put in place to ensure compliance by the respective parties to whatever was decided by the process.

In summary under this model, adequate technical preparations regarding the situation within Rwanda around the neighbouring states and external players were carried out. Since the process needed a lot attention to detail, summit as a model and strategy for resolving conflict was completely eliminated. The only summit that was held in the course of the entire thirteen months negotiations process was for the signing of ceremony of the Peace Agreement, on August 4th 1993,

The Summitry instrument and high level' political and diplomatic interventions were, however, reserved as 4WD or levers for change or fast track movement, in the event the negotiations got stuck in the mud or became characterised by excessive posturing. For instance, when the negotiations were temporarily derailed, in February 1993, as a result of cease-fire violations that led to military confrontations inside Rwanda, a High Level Consultative meeting was convened in Dar es Salaam chaired by the Prime Minister of Tanzania and attended by the Senior leadership of the two parties, in the first week of March, 1993. That High Level Consultative meeting, successfully put' the negotiations back; on track and restored trust and confidence between the two parties to allow the negotiations to proceed, at a much higher speed.

In the course of the negotiations we also maintained and deployed high level contacts, at bilateral levels, with the belligerents as well as among the heads of state of the neighbouring countries, with the view to supporting and empowering the facilitation structures in Arusha.

Those contacts also extended to governments and leaders of the external powers who either had interest in or influence over the belligerents as well as the neighbouring countries. The Secretary General of the OAU also maintained close contacts with the facilitation structures in Arusha and made several quiet interventions with the belligerents, regional neighbours, the external powers and the UN Secretary General. In summary, the resolutions model that we had put in place for the Arusha Peace Process, provided sufficient space for creative deployment of every political or diplomatic instrument that was available within and outside the region, to support the and bring about peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Rwandese deep rooted conflicts.

### **RULE NO 3**

#### **MONITOR CONFLICT ESCALATION LEVELS AND ESTABLISH ENTRY POINT FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT**

In many occasions, endeavors to resolve deep rooted conflicts become complicated or end up in failures, largely because intervention measures are either take too early or too late. The need for the intervening party to keep close touch with the conflict situation as well as the ability to make correct assessment on the dynamics of the conflict therefore, become quite critical.

A major difficulty encountered in the dynamics of deep rooted conflicts is that once it breaks into t-he open or advance into a higher phase of intensity, it becomes much more difficult to resolve, unless it ripens, on its own or through induction. Either of the two latter cases, would very much depend on the convergence of compelling forces - natural or creatively

manipulated by domestic, regional or international players, on their own or through synergistic measures and initiatives, like the Arusha Peace Process.

Whatever the case, for any third party intervention or mediation to succeed, a deep rooted conflict has to ripen, on its own or through creative manipulation of factors that govern that conflict. In that regard the belligerents or parties to the conflict need to be positively disposed to the negotiated settlement, either genuinely or for a mere sake of giving it a try while reserving fallback positions. The challenge to the mediator and/or facilitator, then becomes the ability to monitor and assess the levels of positive disposition of each party and work for significant enhancement of such dispositions and commitments to negotiated settlement.

In the case of Rwanda, it was quite obvious that when the conflict broke into the open in October 1 990, the late President Habyarimana, strongly believed in military rather than negotiated solutions. However, the heavy military defeats that the Rwandese Government forces experienced in late 1991, forced the late President Habyarimana to consider a negotiated settlement, initially to locate-a breathing space for the reorganisation of his forces, and at later stages in 1992, the momentum of the peace process caught up on him, and forced him to participate fully, up to the end of the Arusha Peace Negotiations.

Our preparatory team for the negotiations framework picked up positive signals in May and June 1992, when the two parties secretly met directly, in Brussels and Paris to discuss the principals for direct negotiations. Those meetings as well as political and military developments inside Rwanda, at the stage clearly suggested to us that the conflict was ripe for effective negotiated intervention and we went all out for it.

Our final consultations with the two parties, on the commencement of the Arusha Peace:Process, took place in Dakar, Senegal, in June 1992. e. two parties freely chose Tanzania to be the venue and President Mwinyi, the Facilitator of those negotiations, effectively side-stepping the late President Mobutu as the official Mediator of the regional

peace initiative due to the spoiler role that he was playing. For reasons of Mobutu's ego, as it related to the regional geopolitics, he remained the official mediator but without any substantive role to play in the Arusha Peace Process.

### **RULE NO 3**

#### **FORMULATE APPROPRIATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FRAMEWORK, PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS PHASE**

The two aforesaid measures should lead to the formulation of, a framework for negotiations in the envisaged peace process. This exercise should be based on the products derived from the contacts with the parties as well as readings on the lever of positive disposition towards negotiated settlement of each party and other regional and international players. The framework for the proposed alternative or cutting edge diplomacy proposed should, therefore, focus on getting beyond the unstructured initial contacts as well as cosmetics, and instead constitute a structured approach to the issues of basic human rights and needs, in a manner that is consistent with the characteristics of deep rooted conflicts. It should be structured in a manner that builds confidence between the parties to the conflict and adds momentum as well as integrity to the peace process itself. Experiences of other conflict areas should also be incorporated.

In the case of the Arusha Peace Negotiations, the framework was based on the following stages and principles:

(a) Agreement on cessation of hostilities or cease-fire, should precede all other measures and allow free political activities in order to add credibility to the sincerity of the negotiation process. The concept of Joint Political Military Commission (J:PMC) was brought in to ensure compliance. (July 1992)

(b) Formal and joint identification of the root causes of the conflict and spelling out both the vision and objectives of the Peace Process, in terms of dealing with the legacies of the situation which caused the conflict as well as creation of a new order that would be characterised by the universal values of democracy and human rights and needs as well as rule of the law.

(August 1992)

(c) Negotiate and agree on power sharing principles and practices-for the transitional phase as well as put;n place, transitional arrangements and institutions that would drive the process, to the envisaged new order.

(September 1992 - January 1995)

(d) Negotiate and agree on the integration of forces, on the basis of proportional representation of troops to the new national army in a manner that effectively addresses the concerns and sensitivities of the majority and the fears of the minority. The neutrality and integrity of the envisaged new national army be further strengthened by a formula and mechanisms that provide for horizontal and vertical integration as well as the establishment of parity across all the security and military establishments in a manner that creates a truly representative, new national army and security establishment, that enjoy the confidence and trust of the entire society.

All levels of command and control need to be jointly shared and exercised to ensure that no party could generate or organise a hostile military or security exercise, without the knowledge of the other. Such a process as well as the exercise of demobilisation of forces, their rehabilitation and surrender of surplus arms which would not be part of the arsenal of the new array, should be completed well ahead of the holding of free and fair elections. (March 1992 - July, 1993).

(e) Identification negotiation and reach agreement on all miscellaneous issues which have to be part of the peace agreement and have a bearing to the successful implementation of the Peace Process. (July 1993)

(f) Through close collaboration with refugees hosting states and UNHCR agree on the smooth and well organised voluntary repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and their resettlement, in their own country. (June 199,)

(g) Develop appropriate socio-economic strategies, that would substantially expand the economic space and activity, with close collaboration with the international donor community This are is quite critical for purposes of peace building and sustainability of the Proce Process.

(h) Holding of free and fair elections at the end of the transitional period and after fulfillment of the other components of the Peace Process, particularly the new framework for the integration of forces and creation of a truly, new national army. The elections should be held much after the establishment of the fully integrated national army, resettlement of the demobilised troops and collection of all surplus weapons.

In the final days of the apartheid conflicts and prior to the commencement of formal negotiations, a three phase peace framework was also put in place, which focused on the (a) creation of atmosphere that allowed free political activity, (b) creation of atrnosphere for free negotiations and, (c) the convention of all party conference to negotiate and agree upon the country's constitutional principles and transitional arrangements.

## **RULE NO 4: ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE STRUCTURES FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION**

Both the dynamics and intricacies of resolving deep rooted conflicts requires a strong structure that would drive the entire process of initial preparations for intervention, actual intervention or negotiations as well as the implementation phase of the peace process.

The choice and qualities of the mediator and/or facilitator had been discussed before. While the mediator and/or facilitator provides the overall strategic leadership of the entire peace process below him or her should be a person of proven professional standards on conflict resolution matters, particularly deep rooted conflicts. This will be the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the entire peace process and would be assisted by a team of qualified assistants, with sufficient skills and experience in a range of areas, including language. Where such skills and experience do not exist within the team, they should be outsourced, permanently or for specific purposes.

In the case of the Arusha Peace Process for Rwanda, former President Ali Hassan Mwinyi was the Facilitator and I was his Special Representative In the process, I was able to build a team of seven officers, with whom we collectively drove the peace process up- to the conclusion of the negotiations and the signings of the Peace Agreement on August 4 1998.

On occasions that the team lacked sufficient political instruments or weight the Prime Minister and other cabinet ministers were. made available to the process. At different stages of the negotiations, we also outsourced skills and experiences, including lawyers; intelligence officers, experts on refugee matters and military experts from the Tanzanian National Military Academy at Monsull (near Arusha) as well as from the regional neighbours and some of the observer nations and organisations represented at the talks, particularly the United states, France, the OAU and the UNDP.

There was also a structural linkage between the OAU and the UN, at the level of Secretaries General, who backed up the team and the process. Diplomatic observers from Uganda, Burundi, the United States, France, Belgium, Germany, OAU, and the UN, who were permanently made available to the team and the process and, therefore, provided an invaluable support to the team, although, at times some of those observers needed closer control particularly as they tried to pursue and impose their own national interests over the negotiating parties, in a manner that could spoil the process. Honesty, integrity professional excellence and impartiality were the key qualities for all those who were permanently deployed on the peace process, at Arusha.

## **RULE NO.5**

### **ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE STRATEGY AND TACTICS FOR DEEP ROOTED CONFLICTS**

Any attempt for comprehensive and serious engagement in resolving deep rooted conflicts, needs to be backed up by clearly formulated strategies and tactics, that are put in place for the entire peace process, right from the preparatory stage. Such strategies and tactics should continuously be refined and improved, on the basis of the dynamics of the negotiations and the peace process itself

One of the key strategies that needs to be adequately and effectively applied arises from the fact that, successful and sustainable resolution of deep rooted conflict, very much hinges on the extent to which the parties to the conflict, are prepared to face and talk to each other directly, over the conference table. The Peace Process, therefore, need to be pursued and managed in an evolutionary and incremental manner, based on the objective realities that exist as well as the dynamics of the process itself.

The parties to the negotiations should, therefore, be encouraged to talk to each other, directly, as much as possible, both in and outside the negotiating room. Informal discussions between opposing parties, in groups as well as individually, should be encouraged quite frequently particularly in the early stages of the negotiations.

More time should be allocated to informal consultations in small committee meetings. Plenary sessions should only be used to formalize agreements but not to conduct actual negotiations. If the latter becomes the case, the tendency among the parties would be more to play for the gallery in discrediting and denouncing opponents, rather than a determination to seek meaningful and workable solutions or build consensus.

Early success in addressing and resolving areas of less controversy usually helps to build momentum as well as trust and confidence between each other and the peace process itself. Areas of material differences should only be brought up when sufficient goodwill momentum, trust and confidence, has been established. Such issues should, therefore, initially be raised and pursued through informal or proximity talks, until the differences have sufficiently been narrowed down to logical proportions. Proper and updated record of all the discussions should be maintained to avoid change of heart among the negotiations. The ability on the part of the facilitator to provide compromise solutions, where the negotiating parties themselves fail, is quite critical to the success of the negotiations. The ability on the part of the facilitator to provide compromise solutions, where the negotiating parties themselves fail, is quite critical to the success of the negotiations.

In that regard, there must also be a media strategy that optimises publicity over the successes reached at each stage of negotiations and plays down areas of material differences, until the gaps become narrower. Such a strategy, particularly the positive signals that it generates, even during the times of great difficulties in the negotiations, also helps the maintenance of cease-fire arrangements and public support for the process.

The above, therefore, suggest that the role of the facilitator should largely be focussed to level the playing field for the negotiators and spend more time listening to the parties, as they argue with each other, and only intervene when the negotiations get of hand or are threaten

The totality of the above, therefore, constituted major strategies and tactics that characterised the Arusha Peace Process. It was quite clear during the entire process that, whenever evident progress had been achieved along the route, artificial fears and mistrusts that had existed between the parties to the conflict, became substantially reduced and a sense of mutual confidence and achievement grew. Extensive consultations were regularly held between and among the parties to the conflict, both formally and informally as well as with the observers to the talks.

Another key strategy for the peace process that was effectively deployed, had been in the form of leveraging the trust and confidence that Tanzania enjoyed from both parties as well as the observers. Tanzania's good intentions and profound commitment to the peace process, as well as its proven impartiality and professional handling of the negotiations,' proved to be the only hope for a meaningful and sustainable solution, particularly in the light of the geopolitics of the region. None of the two parties wanted to walk away from Tanzania and the negotiations. They both realised the profoundness of the implications of such a move. All these factors were, therefore, carefully and creatively managed, by the facilitating structures, to provide power energy and influence over the parties to the conflict and, therefore, sustain the peace process.

Any major breakthrough at different stages of the negotiations such as reaching an agreement on a Protocol, had to be given maximum publicity and immediate support by all the capitals of the observer nations and organisations. The principal objective of those strategies and tactics was to enhance the momentum of the process, build more confidence and trust, raise its credibility and integrity and isolate the forces of status quo within Rwanda, and outside, who were bent to throw spanners into the works.

Other aspects of the strategy and tactics applied during the process, such as deadlines, threats and incentives, were applied selectively and creatively. The Senior Political leadership of Tanzania and other regional neighbours were continuously engaged and deployed, to play the role of a 4 wheel drive, in the events that the process got stuck into the mud or progress on the ground became severely limited.

## **RULE NO.6**

### **ALLOCATE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO THE PEACE PROCESS**

One of the strongest drawbacks in dealing with African conflicts, is in the form of lack of requisite material and financial resources that are required for any type of third party intervention, at the level of the OAU as well as its member states. In many occasions, good opportunities for successful interventions are left to pass by, simply because the national government of the neighbouring states and afar, do not have resources to convene meetings or dispatch envoys.

When it comes to peace keeping or monitoring operations, the entire exercise becomes a nightmare.

International donor assistance, when it is made available, mostly focuses on emergency and humanitarian assistance, largely to the refugees and displaced persons, driven by periodic conscience pricking images of Africa as seen on the CNN, BBC or Sky news. Assistance from international institutional framework when available, is subjected to prolonged bureaucratic processes and procedures, which are quite inconsistent with the urgent nature of the required -interventions.

This problem becomes even much more pronounced for the fact that peace processes for deep rooted conflicts, usually take much longer duration's than normally envisaged. Public or tax-payer outcry over growing expenditures and engagement numerous and seemingly,

irreconcilable belligerents and unending peace processes exert additional pressures to peace initiatives and elected representatives. Yet, African member states, the OAU as well as the entire international community, still carry a high moral and political responsibility to find the most innovative and creative solutions to this major drawback.. Some donor countries and organisations have already started to take positive steps in that direction but their bureaucratic processes and still run far behind the speed of intervention that is usually required for resolving deep rooted conflicts.

The efficiency of the Arusha Peace Process was also affected by the above situation, until the Netherlands Denmark, Germany, the United States, France and the OAU came to back up Tanzania's limited resources but far down the road. At an early stage of the negotiations, the implementation of the cease-fire agreement suffered a serious delay, largely because of lack of resources, although the governments of Senegal, Mali, Zimbabwe and Namibia, had already' put the troops ready for immediate deployment.

#### **RULE NO.7**

#### **SYNCHRONISE AND CREATE A SEAMLESS STRUCTURAL LINKAGE BETWEEN NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION PHASES.**

Since the issues of trust, confidence, integrity, reliability, recognition and security are-key in providing meaningful and sustainable solutions to deep rooted conflicts, and the entire negotiation process works to underscore those issues, they should be pursued with the same magnitude of real, commitment and determination throughout. The implementation phase, particularly during the initial stages. Such an approach is quite critical in maintaining the integrity and credibility of the entire peace process.

In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security lies squarely with that body, through the Security Council. As a result the implementation of many peace agreements and processes are entrusted on that body. It is imperative, therefore, that the policy framework structures and procedures of the

UN are comprehensively reviewed, with the view to linking and synchronizing, them with the negotiation phase right from the beginning, in the event the former phase has been undertaken by players, other than the UN itself.

The UN system must keep itself fully aware of all the characteristics intricacies and critical factors that forepart of the peace agreements characteristics of deep rooted conflicts and thereof, reached. and carry them forward to the implementation phase. It should develop maximum flexibility in its policies and procedures in the manner that is consistent with the delicate nature and sensitivities of managing deep rooted conflicts. It should also be fully aware of both, the success factors and the failure factors that are found in peace agreement.

The Arusha Peace Process was fully aware of the above requirement and from the very beginning of the process it had actively engaged the UN, through the OAU. A representative of the UN was also attached to the negotiations. However, in the course of the interaction between the UN and the facilitators in Arusha directly or through its representative-or through the OAU, it became quite apparent that the UN procedures were too rigid to cope with the flexibility that was required in putting together and implementing the peace agreement. Point out this, without making any insinuations about the collapse of the Peace Agreement in April 1994, some seven months after it was signed and remained unimplemented.

That was more so, when one considered that, speed was of essence in sustaining the trust and confidence that was generated, expanded and consolidated by the Peace Agreement factors that are so critical in resolving deep rooted conflicts. Most of the failure factors that were identified during the negotiation phase were linked to that reality, and the implementation agency was made fully aware of them. For instance, although the peace agreement required immediate implementation and strict adherence to the time schedules that were mutually agreed upon, the delay of over seven months in putting in. place the transitional institutions of governance became an obvious recipe for the breakdown and collapse of the peace agreement. More meaningful, creative and innovating ways must be

found to address those issues and linkages for successful conclusions of regional peace initiatives and processes.

**RULE NO 8: FOR PURPOSES OF PEACE BUILDING, PUT IN PLACE SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICIES THAT WOULD EXPAND POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SPACE**

Any meaningful endeavour to resolve deep a rooted conflict and establish sustainable peace and stability, must be backed with socioeconomic policies that would optimise the expansion of political, social and economic space. Such policies should also be fully linked to regional socio-economic integration processes.

The international community has a special role to play in this endeavour. In the case of Rwanda and, indeed, the entire Great Lake Region, the issue of all inclusive political and economic processes are critical. Due to small geographical sizes of those countries vis-a-vis high population density and, therefore, accrue land shortage, appropriate development strategies must be put in place and funded, that would locate additional areas of economic areas other than peasantry farming

We are all too aware that there is no development without peace just as there would not be peace without development. The Arusha Peace Process also touched on these issues and the ir relevance to the quest for sustainable peace and stability in Rwanda, but they could not be further detailed or pursued because they fail for outside the mandate of that process.

**Conclusion**

This presentation has clearly indicated how complex and difficult it is to resolve deep rooted conflicts. However, with proper concepts, structures and strategies, it is possible to find sustainable solutions to deep rooted conflicts.

The most comprehensive political and technical preparations that were done prior to the commencement and at each stage of the Arusha Peace process as well as the profound support and confidence that the process was able to win for itself within Rwanda, in the region and from the international community as a whole, not only produced an internationally acclaimed, high quality, and comprehensive agreement that was signed in this very hall on August 4 1993, it also serves as a reference point within Rwanda to date.

Any future considerations for sustainable peace and stability within Rwanda and in the neighborhood, would have to draw reference from that agreement.

As we continue with our evaluation of the Arusha Peace Process, it would, therefore, be important to make a clear distinction between the success of the negotiating phase of the peace process and the failures that were encountered during the implementation phase of that good peace agreement. In the course of this presentation I have identified some of those factors. Lessons that would be drawn out of this exercise should put this region and Africa as a whole in a better position to handle deep rooted conflicts. In the end and through adequate evolution of comprehensive rules of the game, for resolving deep rooted should be developed for that purpose.

I thank you for your attention.