
BURUNDI :
ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION 1993 - 1995

Prof. René Lemarchand

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

In the headlong rush to multiparty democracy, for a brief moment Burundi stood as one of the most promising candidates: "One of the most remarkable transitions to democracy yet seen in Africa" is how one Western Embassy described the outcome of the June, 1993 elections - "a model for all aspiring democracies", echoed another. Two years and tens of thousands of dead later, not to mention hundreds of thousands forced into exile, Burundi has become one of the continent 's most intractable basket cases. In the wake of the wreckage created by the failed putsch of October 21, 1993 it is seen as second only to Rwanda in the list of states subject to recurrent bouts of ethnic insanity.

In the post-script to the First Edition, written in the teeth of Ndadaye's assassination, I tried to capture the immediate dimensions of the ensuing cataclysm. Much has happened since then, but one thing at least emerges with reasonable clarity: international pressures to restore the status quo ante proved singularly ineffectual in preventing Tutsi extremists from capturing

what little was left of the state, a situation that prompted one observer to describe the attempted take-over by the army as "one of the most successful failed coups in history". (1) As is now painfully evident, Burundi 's descent into hell has been accompanied, if not precipitated, by the sharp reversal of political fortunes suffered by the majority party in parliament, the predominantly Hutu **Front Démocratique du Burundi** (Frodebu), and the spectacular reassertion of Tutsi supremacy under the banner of the **Union du Progrès National** (Uprona) and its allies. What follows is an attempt to put this sequence of events in the perspective of the principal theme explored in this volume: how violence generates myth-making, which itself becomes a constitutive element of further violence. The phenomenon, I suggest, lies at the heart of Burundi 's instant metamorphosis from "a model for all aspiring democracies" into a society gravid with premonitions of genocidal slaughter.

Much of the argument set forth in this book is in the form of a demolition job. It involves a fundamental questioning of "tribalism" as a conceptual tool for comprehending the past; that is less than appropriate to make sense of recent events is equally plain. For anyone trying to make sense of Burundi 's bloodstained trajectory since 1993 its limitations are just as evident today as they were back in 1972, when at least 100,000 Hutu perished at the hands of an all-Tutsi army. For if Hutu and Tutsi increasingly tend to define each other in terms of mutually antagonistic categories this is because ethnic identities have acquired a moral dimension - whether as a martyred community or a threatened minority - they never had before.

Genocide - Remembered, Invented and Anticipated

Myth-making in Burundi is inextricably bound up with the experience - real or anticipated - of genocide. For the Tutsi it involves both inventing and forgetting, inventing one genocide (the 1993 killings of Tutsi) and forgetting another (the 1972 Hutu genocide); for the Hutu it means looking at the 1972 genocide as the most likely scenario for future apocalypses. Here as elsewhere in the world myth-making generates a constant interface between past and present, between discourse and practice, ideology and violence.

Not atavistic hatreds, but something closer to what Benedict Anderson calls "imagined communities" (2) lies behind the litany of horrors chronicled by the media. Behind the murders of political opponents, the systematic ethnic cleansing of urban and rural districts, the armed attacks against refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the ambushes of civilians, lies the conviction held by each community that unless the other's "crimes" are sanctioned by retribution in kind planned annihilation will inevitably follow. The reciprocal demonization of the "other" can best be seen as a social construct rooted in the impending threat of genocide.

In the collective psyche of Hutu and Tutsi two genocides compete for recognition - and condemnation: the Hutu genocide of 1972 in Burundi, and the Tutsi genocide of 1994 in Rwanda. So far from cancelling each other, the result has been to create an unbridgeable moral distance between Hutu and Tutsi. For the Tutsi minority the imperative of physical survival makes recourse to violence inevitable if not morally justifiable; for the Hutu majority there can be no foreswearing of counter-violence as long as impunity remains the rule - as it has been since 1972 - and the army the main beneficiary of impunity.

A Watershed Event

To properly grasp the relationship between "events" and "identities" the October 21, 1993 putsch must be seen for what it really is - not just "a stupid and criminal act", (3) but a watershed event. By turning their guns (or machetes) against President Melchior Ndadaye and two other leading Frodebu personalities - Pontien Kalibwami and Gilles Bizamubute, respectively President and Vice-President of the National Assembly - the putchists did more than physically eliminate three of Burundi's most brilliant minds (one Tutsi and two Hutu). They also destroyed a nascent inter-ethnic consensus. They undid in a few hours what a democratic transition begun five years earlier had so painstakingly tried to accomplish. And they destroyed the hopes of hundreds and thousands of Hutu that the time had finally come when they would no longer be treated as political pariahs - or worse.

No one was better able to articulate this pluralist vision of democracy than Ndadaye himself. After three decades of Tutsi hegemony, there finally emerged on the horizon the promise of a civil society free of ethnic violence, where citizenship would no longer be held hostage by ethnic identity.

Only if we remind ourselves of the context of the Burundi transition - including the extraordinarily high level of expectations among the Hutu in general, and no few Tutsi as well - can we begin to understand the violent reaction of the Hutu communities on the hills when they heard the shattering news. The announcement of Ndadaye's death hit the countryside with the force of an earthquake. A blind rage suddenly seized Frodebu militants and peasants alike in almost every province, causing them to kill every Tutsi in sight. For a sample of the cruelties inflicted by Hutu upon Tutsi, and sometimes by Hutu (Frodebistes) upon Hutu (Upronistes), there is no better source than the report of the **International Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in Burundi (hereafter cited as ICI)**. (4) From the countless testimonies heard by the Commission, the picture that emerges is one of unadulterated savagery. In one commune after another scores of men, women and children were hacked to pieces with machetes, speared or clubbed to death, or burned alive after being

doused with kerosene. Of the active involvement of some communal and provincial authorities in the massacres, there can be no doubt (even though there were many exceptions). From all appearances, however, little prodding was needed for the crowds to heed their incitements.

As in August 1988, when Hutu peasants suddenly turned against Tutsi in Ntega and Marangara, memories of 1972 came back with an emotional charge made all the more potent by intimations of an impending massacre of Hutu populations. As one Hutu clergyman from the commune of Mutaho reported: "When we told them ("les excités") not to spill blood, they said: 'Look, since 1972 it is our blood that's being spilled ! Now we hear that President Ndadaye has been killed. If they did that, that means that we are next...'"(5) One Hutu from the same commune tersely commented: "Back in 1972 they got us, but this time they won't!" ("en 1972 ils nous ont eus, ils ne nous auront plus!"). Even the logistics of the operations, involving the felling of trees to deny vehicles access to the communes, harked back to 1972: "They (the Hutu) knew that in 1972 vehicles drove in and picked up people in the communes. That's how my father was picked up. He was a modest cultivator... This has remained etched in the people's memory: the vehicles have got to be stopped !..." Clearly, if the evidence collected by the ICI is to be trusted, everything about the tone and feelings experienced by the participants in the carnage suggests a spontaneous outburst of collective rage - a rage ignited by the mixture of anger, humiliation and despair felt by every Frodebiste upon learning the devastating news of Ndadaye's assassination. That his death could have been seen by some as the harbinger of another bloodbath is hardly surprising.

The exact number of human lives lost will never be known. If the total of 50,000 dead cited by the ICI seems plausible, it is important to remember that approximately half of these consist of Hutu men, women and children massacred by the army in the course of the ensuing repression. Here also the ICI report leaves few doubts as to the brutality of the military as they went about the task of restoring "peace and order". In Karemba, to cite only one example, we are told that "the military came in lorries, armored cars and pick-up trucks. They summoned all the inhabitants to a meeting. They told the people to lie down on the ground. Then they threw a hand grenade into the group, and finished them off with their bayonets.

About forty people were killed".(6) Where the Hutu population had already fled, their houses were put to the torch, their shops looted, their cattle killed.

What stands terrifyingly exposed by Ndadaye's assassination is the horrible cheat played upon both Hutu and Tutsi, not just in Burundi but in Rwanda as well. Neither were exonerated of the retribution visited upon one community by the other. Ironically, the only group to be exonerated of punishment are the authors of the putsch. At the time of this writing none had been brought to justice.

Conspiracy Theory as Myth-marking

Filtered through the lens of politicized Tutsi ethnicity, the events of 1993 are seen in a very different light. What is involved, we are told, is not an attempted coup followed by an outburst of ethnic violence, but a dastardly Frodebu plot to physically eliminate the Tutsi minority. In point of fact, according to a document issued by several pro-Tutsi opposition parties in December 1993, there were two plots unfolding at precisely the same time, one aimed at the government, resulting in the assassination of President Ndadaye by a handful of "deranged army men" ("une poignée de militaires perdus"), the other involving "the cold-blooded, methodical genocide of the Tutsi minority and Hutu members of the Uprona". Responsibility for the latter lies squarely with the Frodebu: "The Frodebu and its administrative cadres bear the heavy responsibility of having engineered and executed the genocide of Tutsi and Hutu members of the Uprona... Speaking on Radio-Kigali, four ministers have incited Frodebu militants to physically eliminate Hutu and Tutsi opponents, presented as enemies of democracy... The authors of these criminal declarations are Messieurs Kabushemeye, Nyangoma, Minani and Ngendahayo, all members of the Frodebu government". In short, "what happened to our country is not an accident, but a catastrophe engineered by the Frodebu".(7)

The least one can say is that this "two-simultaneous-conspiracies" strains credulity. That the carnage was consecutive to, and not concomitant with the assassination of Ndadaye, is well established.(8) Equally clear is that we are not dealing with a case of planned annihilation, as happened in Rwanda in 1994, but with a spontaneous outburst of rage, fueled by memories of 1972 and actively encouraged in some localities by militant Frodebistes and local administrators. As for the incitements to violence attributed to Frodebu ministers, it is only fair to note that their exhortations to stop the putschists were never phrased in the form of an invitation to physically eliminate the opposition, much less as an incitation to genocide.(9)

Myths are always productive of meanings, and in this case the message carried devastating implications. For one thing, since there were two plots taking place at precisely the same moment there is no logical reason to blame the authors of the failed putsch for what happened afterwards because it was going to happen anyway. In short, there is no causal link between Ndadaye's assassination and the subsequent killing of Tutsi. Some might even argue that the timely intervention of the army against Ndadaye saved the Tutsi minority of an even worse fate. Furthermore, given the fact that "the thesis of a spontaneous and vengeful anger is only a thinly veiled attempt to cover the crime (of genocide)", (10) there can be no justification for compromise with the Frodebu. Its involvement in genocide disqualifies it from exercising power: "How can one possibly envisage entrusting the affairs of the country to a fascist and terrorist organization that has systematically planned and executed the slaughter of its citizens?". (11) And since the Frodebu leadership, like its rank-and-file, is largely Hutu there can be no question that the threat posed to the Tutsi minority is, in essence, a Hutu threat. Furthermore, given the nature of the menace, any attempt to restructure the predominantly Tutsi army would have suicidal consequences for the Tutsi minority.

Identity Readjustments

Unsurprisingly, some striking identity readjustments followed. Few Tutsi today would endorse the once fashionable notion that "there are no Hutu or Tutsi - we are all Barundi". No longer can it be said of the Tutsi elites that they suffer from a self-induced bout of ethnic amnesia, designed to mask their political supremacy (see chapter 2, p. 30 ff.). In the wake of the 1993 killings it is their turn to see themselves as **le peuple martyr**, and to use this self-image as a social construct to dehumanize the Hutu as a group.

Nowhere is this kind of ethnic reductionism more dramatically illustrated than in the so-called "Seventeen rules of Tutsi conduct", issued in the form of a bi-lingual tract (French and Kirundi) in Bujumbura. The document is perhaps best described as the Tutsi equivalent of the openly racist Hutu pamphlet ("The Ten Commandments of the Hutu") published in Rwanda by the review **Kangura** (Kigali) in December 1990. To quote: "Do not trust a Hutu or anyone supposed to be one... Do not buy anything from a Hutu... Try to locate Hutu residences so that you will know, when the time comes, whom to save and whom to liquidate... Stay armed so as not to be caught by surprise; as you know we don't have enough rifles for all Tutsi, that's why you need to get hold of cutlasses and spears to defend yourselves while waiting for the army to arrive..."

Some Hutu women look like Tutsi, and their job is to spy on us; be careful ! Do not trust appearances; they are as dangerous as Aids... There are subtle ways to exterminate Hutu people: you can isolate them in the bush, and make them disappear one after the other, **ni vu ni connu**; you can send them pretty girls or Rwandese prostitutes; you can put TB in their food or their drinks... Hutu kids are spoiled and insouciant: just get hold of the kid who lost his way, then ask his father, elder brother or mother to come and fetch him, and then kill them all...etc."(12)

We make no attempt here to generalize from such extremist views. To impute a racist mind-set to all Tutsi would be as reckless as it would be unfair. The point, rather, is that attitudes such

as these are becoming more widely shared among Tutsi elites as they are being regularly ventilated in the more extremist newspapers.

Identities, then, like events, are reconstructed in accordance with the norms of a dehumanizing myth. Myth-making in this sense is not only a privileged field for the deployment of a racist ideology - and ultimately for discrediting moderate Tutsi elements (like former Prime Minister Anatole Kanyenkiko) as Hutu in disguise; it is equally serviceable for legitimizing violence.

Violence as a Political Strategy

Neither the Frodebu (or what is left of it) nor the Uprona has a lock on violence. Although moderates in each camp repudiate their links with extremists, both have spawned armed militias that are spreading terror throughout the country -- the most notorious on the Tutsi side being the "**Sans échec et sans défaite**" and the "**Solidarité des jeunes pour la défense des minorités**" (Sodejem), the latter led by a Tutsi Dominican priest, Brother Deo Niyonzima; and, on the Hutu side, the **Forces Armées pour la Défense de la Démocratie** (FDD), headed by Frodebu dissident and former minister Leonard Nyangoma. Both have committed unspeakable atrocities in the name of partisan interests or by ethnic vengeance. And in both instances moderates - a rapidly diminishing category - are utterly powerless to curb the excesses of the extremists.

Yet there are significant differences as well. The coded language used by the Uprona to designate its militias - "self-defense teams", as distinct from the "armed bands" of the Frodebu - speaks volumes for the coziness of its` relationship with activist networks. Whereas the military wing of the Frodebu has severed all ties with its parent organization, the Uprona, by contrast, though not organically linked to the militias, operates in close collaboration with them. One wonders whether the spectacular political victories scored by the party since October 1993 (of which more in a moment) would have been possible without the continuing

and disciplined support of its "self-defense" units. It is worth remembering as well that the Uprona enjoys the full backing of the army, or at least of an important faction within the army. Little wonder if, among opposition parties,(13) the Uprona ranks at the top of the list in its ability to use violence or threats of violence to press its claims against the parliamentary majority. The strategy paid off handsomely.

Although violence is a key element in the political arsenal of hard-core Tutsi activists (and this is also true, of course, of their Hutu counterparts), there is a great deal more to the strategy of the opposition than the killing of political opponents and the ethnic cleansing of Hutu quarters in Bujumbura. The fifteen or so leading Hutu personalities killed by Tutsi militias over the last year only tell part of the story. In its effort to consolidate its grip on the political system, the opposition has successfully applied the following principles:

(a) make full use of existing constitutional instruments as long as they can serve the interests of the opposition;

(b) should this "minimalist" strategy fall short of its intended goal, the next step is to alter the constitutional framework in such a way as to allow the opposition greater control over the decision-making process;

(c) should (a) and (b) prove inadequate to ensure effective control of key nominations in the government and the National Assembly, recourse to street violence and intimidation becomes the quickest way to force the government to make concessions;

(d) and to make sure that the capital, Bujumbura, can be swiftly mobilized on behalf of the Uprona and its allies, its ethnic composition must be drastically altered, even if it means unleashing the army against Hutu civilians.

This is not the place for a detailed account of how the Tutsi-dominated constitutional court became a major trump card in the hands of the opposition in its efforts to block the election

by the National Assembly of a successor to Ndadaye, how a consensus candidate (Cyprien Ntaryamira) was finally elected on January 13, 1994 despite renewed obstruction by the court, and how, after the death of President Ntaryamira - killed together with President Juvenal Habyalimana of Rwanda in the mysterious plane crash of April 6 over Kigali - the court again threatened to declare the election of Ntaryamira's successor (Sylvestre Ntibantuganya) unconstitutional.(14) What needs to be stressed is that in trying to draw maximum advantage from existing constitutional opportunities, the opposition never ceased to back its demands with threats and intimidation.

By mid-1994 it had become apparent that the Uprona and its allies would settle for nothing less than a major reallocation of power,` accompanied by a drastic revamping of the constitutional framework. The operation took place against a background of violent ethnic provocations and "ville morte" ("dead city") tactics intended to bring all activities in the capital city to a standstill. Adding to the climate of fear, in April and May the army, acting under the pretext of disarming of Hutu "hooligans", conducted a series of extremely brutal ethnic cleansing operations in Bujumbura. Shortly thereafter, in June, Tutsi youth and army men killed hundreds of Hutu in the provinces of Muramvya, Kayanza, Ngozi and Bururi.

By then the Frodebu leadership knew it had no choice but to give in to the demands of the opposition. The result was a power-sharing agreement that gave 60 percent of positions in the government and the administration (including provincial and communal posts) to the Frodebu and 40 per cent to the Uprona. Enshrined in a "**protocole d'accord**" signed on July 12, 1994, the power-sharing deal nonetheless failed to satisfy the demands of the opposition, and by September an even more far-reaching agreement was concluded. This was the famous **Convention de Gouvernement**, which, in effect, introduced a whole new set of constitutional arrangements, ostensibly designed to put the Uprona in the driver's seat. (15) Not only does it raise the "quota" of political and administrative posts allowed to the Uprona and its allies from 40 to 45 percent, but, more importantly, it thoroughly emasculates the constitutional prerogatives of both the government and the National Assembly and vests all executive authority in the hands of a 10-member National Security Council (NSC). Only two

of its members are **de jure** members (the President of the Republic and the Prime Ministers); all are nominated by the President of the Republic on the proposition of political parties and after consulting with the representatives of the civil society" (art. 18). With the NSC under the control of a Tutsi/Uproniste majority, power is now clearly in the hands of the opposition. The implications are nowhere more clearly stated than by Filip Reyntjens: "**The Convention de Gouvernement** is the institutional translation of the October 1993 coup: the constitution has been shelved and the outcome of both the presidential and parliamentary elections swept aside as the president and parliament are placed under the tutelage of an unconstitutional body". (16)

More was needed, however, to satiate the appetite of the Uprona hard-liners, for now came up the question of how to evict from their positions of responsibility those elements that the party saw as "undesirable". The first to come under attack was a key Frodebu personality, Jean Minani, who replaced Ntibantuganya as President of the National Assembly when the latter became President of the Republic. Falsely accused of incitations to ethnic violence in October 1993 (and hence of being a participant in genocide), Minani at first refused to step down. In so doing Minani had the full backing of Prime Minister Anatole Kanyenkiko, a Tutsi member of the Uprona. At this point the Tutsi **milices** sprang into action, and started turning the heat on the Hutu in Bujumbura. Dozens of people were reported killed in December 1994, as public manifestations of support for Uprona hard-liners were staged in the capital. Once again the Frodebu caved in to pressure from the street and on January 12 Leonce Ngendakumana became President of the National Assembly. But now came the turn of Kanyenkiko to be raked over the coals for his support of Minani. In a blistering indictment of his "betrayal", the Executive Committee of the Uprona reported to the Central Committee that the Prime Minister's "logic" was "in complete contradiction with the options and combat methods of the Uprona". (17) And once again the same scenario unfolded: his refusal to comply with the request of the Uprona Central Committee that he resign from his post unleashed a series of strikes, "ville morte" tactics and public manifestations, confronting the government with a thoroughly unmanageable situation. On February 22, 1995, Antoine Nduwayo, a Tutsi hard-liner, replaced Kanyenkiko as Prime Minister.

All that was left for the hard-core Upronistes to consolidate their grip on the government was to convert the capital into an urban Tutsiland. This was accomplished on March 23-24, when the army, assisted by Tutsi militias, moved into the Hutu strongholds of Bwiza and Buyenai and proceeded to kill every Hutu in sight and put their houses to the torch. Some 400 Hutu men, women and children were reported killed, while an estimated 30,000 proceeded to seek refuge in Zaire. Violence quickly spread to the rural sectors. Makamba, Rutana and Cankuzo were the only provinces to be spared. While army units were being attacked by Hutu militias, the army responded by killing hundreds of Hutu civilians in Muyinga, Bubanza, Karuzi, Bururi and Gitega. In Muyinga alone the US Ambassador, Robert Krueger, reported "a minimum of 400 people killed", causing a massive exodus of rural populations. "When I went to the northeast", Krueger added, "we traveled for several kilometers from the village of Gasorwe, the site of the massacre, and did not see a single individual". (18)

From all appearances Burundi has reached yet another turning point on its path to self-destruction. With the credibility of President Ntibantuganya at its lowest ebb, and his party reduced to a shambles, more and more Hutu will be tempted to join the ranks of the extremists. And since the hard-core Upronistes and their allies are now firmly in control of the government, and enjoying the full backing of the army, concessions to what few moderates are left in the government are most unlikely. Nor is moderation encouraged by the rabidly anti-Hutu newspapers circulating in the country, some of which do not hesitate to publish hit-lists of Hutu politicians. Day after day, week after week, the flames of ethnic hatred are fanned through the pages of newspapers like Carrefour des Idées, or La Nation, whose editorials read like the Tutsi equivalent of the once violently racist propaganda of Radio Mille Collines in Kigali. Again, the seemingly unstoppable proliferation of arms acts as a further deterrent to compromise -- as does the expectation of military support from the outside.

Now as before much of what happens in Burundi will be conditioned by what happens in Rwanda - and in Zaire. Already a strong coalescence of interests is emerging between the Hutu refugees from Burundi and their kinsmen from Rwanda, with Zaire serving as a potential

staging arena for launching cross-border raids into their countries of origin. The threats posed to Kigali and Bujumbura by Hutu refugees will not disappear any time soon. If so, one can expect significant cooperative links to develop between the armies of Rwanda and Burundi. In the past Rwanda's military showed few scruples about conducting "search and destroy" operations Burundi. Should the circumstances require, Kagame's men would be the first to lend assistance to their Burundi "brothers" in Burundi. In neither state will Hutu refugees find it easy to evade the wrath of an avenging state, and much of the vengeance, one fears, is likely to be visited on innocent civilians.

In the post-script to the First Edition we tried to summarize the dilemma facing Burundi: "How an all-Tutsi army can be made to coexist with a predominantly Hutu government will remain the central issue of Burundi politics for the foreseeable future". Today, however, the government has virtually ceased to govern. What has emerged instead is a thinly disguised form of military rule, held together by networks of Tutsi politicians, youth gangs, armed militias and army men. Before one can even begin to contemplate a national reconciliation strategy, the question arises as to whether this freakish state can ensure its own survival in the face of renewed threats to its security at home and abroad.

Abidjan, May 5, 1995

Footnotes

1. Filip Reyntjens, *Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1995), p. 16.
2. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed. (London Verso, 1991)
3. Jean-Pierre Chretien, "Burundi: la logique d'une guerre civile" *Esprit* (January 1994), p. 164.
4. See Commission Internationale d'Enquête sur les Violations des Droits de l'Homme au Burundi depuis le 21 Octobre 1993, *Rapport Final* (Bruxelles, July 5, 1995). Participants in the investigation included representatives of seven ONGs: Human Rights Watch (New York and Washington), Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands Lacs (Kigali), Centre National pour la Coopération au Développement (Bruxelles), Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (Paris), Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture (Geneva), Nationaal Centrum voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Bruxelles), Novib (Amsterdam).
5. *Ibid.*, p. 111, 115, 114
6. *Ibid.* p. 130.
7. Collectif des Partis d'Opposition, "Le génocide d'octobre 1993", reproduced in André Guichaoua ed., *Les Crises Politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994)*, (Paris: Karthala, 1995), p. 569. Interestingly, of the four personalities accused of involvement in genocide, one (Kabushemeye) was assassinated in March 1995, another (Minani) was forced to resign from his position as President of the National Assembly in January 1995, a third (Nyangoma) left the Frodebu to become the self-appointed leader of a dissident faction, the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD), and the fourth (Jean-Marie Ngendahayo), a Tutsi of princely origins, is now seen by Tutsi extremists as a stooge who will become the victim of his ambitions. See *Le Carrefour des Idées*, March 8, 1998, No. 51, p. 7.

8. See Commission Internationale d'Enquête, *op. cit.*, p. 176 ff.

9. For a thoroughly unconvincing effort to give respectability to the "1993 killings as genocide" thesis, see Jean-Pierre Chretien, "Burundi: pogromes sur les collines", *Esprit* (July 1994), pp. 1630. "How could we fail to ask ourselves", asks the author, "whether the shameful occultation of the Burundi genocide has not facilitated and encouraged the occurrence of the one in Rwanda?" (p.28). Rather than this "shameful occultation", what has decisively contributed to the Rwanda genocide, I would suggest, is (a) the content of the symbolic message sent to the Hutu elites of Rwanda by Ndadaye's assassination ("You simply cannot trust the Tutsi!"), (b) the very negative impact of this message on the attitude of Hutu hard-liners towards the wisdom of a negotiated solution of the kind contemplated at Arusha, (c) the massive influx into Rwanda of some 300,000 Hutu fleeing the military repression. For further elaboration, see René Lemarchand, "Rwanda: The Rationality of Genocide", *Issue* (forthcoming).

10. "Le génocide d'octobre 1993", *op. cit.*, p.570.

11. *Ibid.* p. 572.

12. "Les 17 règles des Tutsi", in André Guichaoua, *op. cit.*, p. 569; for a Hutu parallel from Rwanda see "Les 10 commandements des Hutu", *ibid.*, p. 604.

13. Among the several smaller Tutsi parties gravitating in the orbit of the Uprona, at least three deserve mention: the Parti pour le Rassemblement National (Parena), led by former President Jean Baptiste Bagaza, the Alliance Burundo-Africaine pour le Salut (Abasa), led by former ambassador to the UN Terence Nsanze, and the Ralliement pour le Droit et le Développement Economique et Social (Raddes). Of these the Parena is widely believed to be the most violently anti-Hutu. It is said to have close links with armed Tutsi militias, in particular with Brother Deo Niyonzima's Solidarité des jeunes pour la défense des minorités

(Sodejem). See Patrick de Saint Exupéry, "Burundi: Les tambours du génocide", Le Figaro, March 16, 1995.

14. Filip Reyntjens, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

15. The full text of the Convention de gouvernement can be found in André Guichaoua, *op. cit.*, pp. 588-598.

16. Filip Reyntjens, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

17. See Rapport du bureau exécutif et du groupe parlementaire au Comité Central du parti Uprona (typescript, Bujumbura: January 14, 1995), p. 21.

18. See International Herald Tribune, April 10, 1995, p. 7.